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Abstract 
Across consequential attributions of attitudes, ability, emotions, and morality, people make correspondent 
inferences. People infer stable personality characteristics from others’ behavior, even when that behavior 
is caused by situational factors. We examined the structure of correspondent inferences and report the 
development and validation of an instrument measuring individual differences in this correspondence bias 
(a Neglect of External Demands scale, or “NED”). The NED is internally consistent and distinct from 
scales and measures of intelligence, cognitive ability, cognitive reflection, general decision making 
ability, preference for control, and attributional style. Individual differences in correspondence bias 
predict blaming people for harmful accidents, believing coerced confessions, correcting for job and task 
difficulty when making performance evaluations and incentive-compatible personnel selections, and 
separating market and fund performance when making incentive-compatible investments. Fortunately, the 
tendency to commit correspondence bias can be reduced. Making situational information easier to process 
debiases those most prone to correspondence bias. 
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People tend to make correspondent inferences when observing others. They infer stable 
personality characteristics from the behavior of others, even when the presence of external factors 
severely constrains the range of possible behaviors other persons might have exhibited. This general 
tendency leads observers to over-attribute the behavior of actors to their enduring dispositions and under-
weight the influence of situational factors, committing a correspondence bias (Ross 1977, Gilbert and 
Malone 1995, Jones 1979, 1990, Jones and Harris 1967). Correspondent inferences are prevalent and 
consequential. Correspondence bias is exhibited by a majority of American adults and generalizes across 
demographic characteristics (Bauman and Skitka 2010). These biased attributions affect a wide variety of 
social judgments including performance and ability assessments in personnel selection and evaluation 
(e.g., Moore et al. 2010), blame and guilt judgments in jury verdicts (e.g., Kassin and Sukel 1997), 
impression formation in social interactions (e.g., Gilbert 1998, Ross et al. 1977), and judgments of moral 
character (Bierbrauer 1979, Miller et al. 1974). Correspondence bias and more general forms of 
correspondent inferences have been studied through the lens of the different attributions made by actors 
and observers such as attitudes, abilities, susceptibility to emotions, and morality (Gawronski 2004).  
We examined whether these various manifestations underlie a general tendency to make 
correspondent inferences, explored consequential managerial and legal implications, and tested whether 
this tendency can be debiased. To this end, we developed an instrument, the Neglect of External 
Demands—NED1—scale, to assess the coherence and structure of the general construct, variations 
between and within persons, and tested its reliability and validity. We found our instrument predicts 
judgments and behaviors in consequential (conceptually related) judgments and decisions: attributions of 
blame for accidental harms, juror verdicts in cases of coerced confessions, the sensitivity of performance 
evaluations to job difficulty, the recognition of unfair advantages and disadvantages when selecting 
personnel, and the consideration of market performance when evaluating the performance of investments. 
These effects were observed even when situational information was provided to participants in a clear 
format, and when controlling for other individual differences such as intelligence, personality, and 
decision making ability. Finally, we tested whether the tendency to make correspondent inferences can be 
debiased. We found that making situational information easier to process debiased the judgments of 
people most prone to make correspondent inferences. 
 
Variety of Correspondent Inferences 
Research on correspondent inferences traces back to Heider’s (1958) theory of “naïve 
psychology,” which distinguished the determinants of behavior into dispositional causes (i.e., 
psychological characteristics that are relatively enduring or invariant over time) and situational causes 
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(i.e., external influences), predicting that observers would tend to prefer dispositional attributions. This 
tension between dispositional and situational influences in the attribution of behavior has been examined 
in four basic paradigms (Gawronski 2004). Each paradigm focuses on a specific type of inference: 
attitudes (i.e., attitude attribution paradigm, Jones and Harris 1967), abilities (i.e., quizmaster paradigm, 
Ross et al. 1977), susceptibility to emotions (i.e., silent interview paradigm, Snyder and Frankel 1976), 
and morality (i.e., moral attribution paradigm, Bierbrauer 1979). 
 Attitudes. The attitude attribution paradigm measures the extent to which observers attribute the 
expressed attitudes and opinions of an actor to her disposition or to the pressures and constraints of her 
situation. A celebrity product endorsement, for example, could be attributed to a favorable opinion of the 
endorsed product or to a financial incentive. Jones and Harris (1967) provided the first empirical evidence 
of correspondence bias in this paradigm. In their study, participants (“observers”) read an essay that 
supported or opposed the Castro regime in Cuba by a writer who had freely chosen or was forced to 
endorse the position of her essay. Observers then inferred the true attitude of the writer toward the Castro 
regime. Observers judged the real attitude of the writer to be consistent with her essay when her position 
was freely chosen, a correct correspondent inference. Observers exhibited correspondence bias in judging 
that the real attitude of the writer was consistent with her essay when she was forced to endorse the 
position of her essay. Jones and Harris interpreted the latter result as a natural tendency of observers to 
evaluate the behavior of actors in terms of individual characteristics rather than in terms of the social 
situations in which the actors are placed. Observers made correspondent inferences in this and many other 
subsequent demonstrations of this attitude attribution paradigm (e.g., D’Agostino and Fincher-Kiefer 
1992, Jones 1979, Krull et al. 1999, Miller and Rorer 1982, Moore et al. 2010), attributing the behavior of 
actors to their disposition even when their behavior was severely constrained by the situation. 
Ability. The quizmaster paradigm measures the extent to which observers consider the difficulty 
of the task an actor performed when evaluating her ability. An airline customer may attribute a flight 
delay, for instance, to the incompetence of an airline or to bad weather that was impossible to avoid. In 
the quizmaster paradigm, participants are randomly assigned to play the role of contestant, quizmaster, or 
observer in a game show. Quizmasters generate challenging questions from their own general knowledge 
and contestants try to answer those questions. This situation favors the quizmaster, who can choose 
questions on obscure and unfamiliar topics. Indeed, contestants fail to answer most of the questions that 
they are posed. Observers first hear the questions and answers. They then judge how knowledgeable are 
the quizmasters and contestants. Observers typically infer that quizmasters are more knowledgeable than 
the contestants (e.g., Ross et al. 1977) because observers insufficiently discount the difficulty of 
answering questions drawn from the personal knowledge of another person. In other words, observers 
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attribute the difficulty that contestants experience to their lack of knowledge rather than to the 
disadvantages of their situation.  
Emotions. The silent interview paradigm measures the extent to which observers attribute the 
physical demeanor of an actor to her disposition or to the pressures and constraints of her situation. A 
person may fidget during an interview, for instance, because she is a nervous person or because of the 
intrusive or personal nature of the questions she is asked.  The silent interview paradigm originated in an 
experiment by Snyder and Frankel (1976), in which participants watched a silent film of a young woman 
being interviewed who behaved somewhat anxiously and then rated her level of dispositional anxiety (see 
also, Gilbert et al. 1988, Krull and Erickson 1995, Lieberman et al. 2005). Participants were told that the 
interview topic was either anxiety provoking or mundane. Reasonably, they should have deemed her to be 
more dispositionally anxious if she looked anxious when interviewed about mundane topics than when 
interviewed about anxiety-provoking topics. Instead, participants tended to attribute the anxiety to her 
personality. They perceived her to be similarly anxious whether the interview topic was anxiety 
provoking or mundane.  
Morality. The moral attribution paradigm measures the extent to which observers attribute the 
moral or immoral behavior of an actor to her disposition or to the pressures and constraints of her 
situation. A public relations firm, for example, may defend a firm’s ethically questionable behavior 
because they believe in the firm’s innocence or because it is their job.  In the moral attribution paradigm 
(Miller et al. 1974, Bierbrauer 1979) participants first read descriptions of experiments demonstrating 
how situational pressures influence moral behavior (e.g., Milgram 1963). They then judged the morality 
of participants who behaved immorally in replications of those experiments. Miller and colleagues 
(1974), for example, had such “knowledgeable” observers rate the behavior of actors in a replication of 
Milgram’s classic obedience to authority study. Despite reading about the powerful influence of 
situational factors on behavior just moments before, observers attributed undesirable dispositions to actors 
who complied with the instructions of an experimenter to administer electroshocks to another participant 
up to the highest voltage level.  
 
Individual Differences and Correspondent Inferences 
The origins and effects of each of these examples of correspondence bias have been examined 
extensively in isolation. It is unclear, however, whether observers exhibit a consistent degree of 
correspondent inference-making across different kinds of judgments in which they must discern the cause 
of a person’s behavior. Research on correspondence bias has proposed several different processes 
underlying the tendency to make correspondent inferences (Gilbert and Malone 1995, Gawronski 2004): 
Correspondence Bias: Measurement, Consequences, and Correction 6 
lack of awareness (i.e., observers may not be aware of the situational influences on the observed 
behavior), unrealistic expectations (i.e., observers may not believe that situational influences are 
sufficiently powerful to produce the observed behavior), inflated categorizations (i.e., awareness of the 
situational constraints influencing the behavior may generate perceptual assimilation and increase the 
weight given to dispositional explanations), and insufficient correction (i.e., the contamination of causal 
attribution by initial inferences about underlying dispositions, which fails to be fully corrected by the 
subsequent consideration of situational constraints).  
Given the multiple inputs to correspondence bias, the propensity to make correspondent 
inferences may vary to such a degree across circumstances that it cannot be described as an individual 
difference. It is also possible that the tendency to make correspondent inferences varies considerably 
across the inferences that observers make. Judgments of ability may be influenced by the ability of 
observers (e.g., Kruger and Dunning 1999), for example, whereas judgments of morality may be driven to 
a greater extent by the degree to which observers are sensitive to disgust (Inbar et al. 2009, Jones and 
Fitness 2008).    
One factor suggesting that the propensity to make correspondent inferences is a stable individual 
difference is the presence of a common inferential correction process underlying correspondence bias 
(Gilbert 1998, Lieberman et al. 2002, Trope 1986). Gilbert (1988) suggested that the initial dispositional 
inferences that people draw when judging the behavior of others are the result of a relatively automatic 
process requiring little effort or conscious attention, which appears to hold across cultures (Lieberman et 
al. 2005). Correction of these automatic inferences to account for situational constraints occurs as the 
result of a more controlled and deliberate process that requires the presence and effortful expenditure of 
cognitive resources (Hagá et al. 2014). As a consequence, the ability and motivation to devote cognitive 
resources to performing that correction process may account for considerable variation across persons in 
the tendency to make correspondent inferences (Gilbert et al. 1988). 
In line with this inferential correction model, individual differences in motivation, cognitive 
ability, and beliefs do appear to be related to susceptibility to correspondence bias in attitude attributions. 
People high in Need for Cognition (NFC), who are more prone to engage in analytic processing 
(Cacioppo and Petty 1982), are less susceptible to correspondence bias because they are more likely to 
correct for situational constraints than are people low in NFC (D'Agostino and Fincher-Kiefer 1992). 
Analogously, people with high levels of need for closure (e.g., who are faster at making judgments and 
feel greater urgency to complete judgments, Webster and Kruglanski 1994), show greater susceptibility to 
correspondence bias in attitude attributions than people with low levels of need for closure (Webster 
1993). Adult observers lacking cognitive abilities such as formal operations—the ability to integrate 
multiple pieces of information such as dispositional and situational factors—appear to engage in less 
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attributional correction and exhibit more correspondence bias than observers with formal operations 
(Blumberg and Silvera 1998). Developmental comparisons also find that younger children are less likely 
to correct for situational influences on actors—a more cognitively demanding task than categorizing or 
characterizing actors (Hagá et al. 2014; c.f., Ruble et al. 1988). Beyond motivation and cognitive ability, 
believing that one should correct for situational pressures also contributes to the tendency to make 
dispositional inferences. The degree to which adults believe that even when constraints are very strong, 
the true traits and attitudes of actors still “leak out” is positively correlated with susceptibility to 
correspondence bias in attitude attributions (Lord et al. 1997). Similarly, people who hold a dispositionist 
lay theory (i.e., a belief that people behave consistently across situations; Norenzayan et al. 2002) are 
more likely to show correspondence bias in attitude attributions (Bauman and Skitka 2010).  
 
Cultural Differences in Correspondent Inference-Making 
A second source of evidence that the tendency to make correspondent inferences may be a stable 
individual difference is represented by the variance of correspondence bias across cultures. Individualistic 
cultures tend to believe that the decontextualized individual, rather than the situation or social context, is 
the primary source of causality (e.g., Newman 1993, Choi et al. 1999). In contrast, collectivistic cultures 
are more likely to believe the situation and the social context to be the primary sources of causality.  
Consistent with these beliefs, attributional differences between observers in individualistic and 
collectivistic societies have been identified. A comparison by Miller (1984) of the attributions made by 
samples in India and the United States found that Americans made more dispositional attributions than 
Indians, whereas Indians made more situational attributions than did Americans. These tendencies were 
not observed in young children, but appeared to increase with cognitive development. Miyamoto and 
Kitayama (2002) found that the correspondence bias was significantly weaker for Japanese than for 
Americans when the behavior was minimally diagnostic of the actor’s attitude. Choi and Nisbett (1998) 
found that the correspondence bias was much weaker for Koreans than for Americans when the 
situational constraint was made more salient. Masuda and Kitayama (2003) found an analogous difference 
between Japanese and American participants. Supporting an inferential correction model, cultural 
differences in correspondent inferences appear to be more a function of the extent to which automatic 
dispositional inferences are subsequently corrected than of differences in automatic dispositional 
inferences (Lieberman et al. 2005). Thus, these cultural differences suggest that there may be systematic 
(environmentally caused) differences in the propensity to make correspondent inferences.   
 
Individual Differences in Judgment 
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A third source of evidence that the tendency to make correspondent inferences may be a stable 
individual difference is that decision making ability and susceptibility to decision making biases appear to 
vary systematically across people (Bruine de Bruin et al. 2007; Levin et al. 2002, Frederick 2005, 
Morewedge et al. 2015, Scopelliti et al. 2015, Stanovich 1999, West and Stanovich 1997). Performance 
across decision making tasks tends to have high internal consistency, with the same people showing 
strong or weak performance across a variety of tasks such as susceptibility to framing effects and sunk 
costs, and appropriately recognizing the limits of their knowledge (Blais et al. 2005, Bornstein and 
Zickafoose 1999, Klayman et al. 1999, Scopelliti et al. 2015, Stankov and Crawford 1996, 1997, 
Stanovich and West 2000). Similar to general decision making ability, correspondent inference-making 
and bias may vary systematically across individuals.  
Most research has examined correspondent inferences by using between-subjects comparisons, 
which do not address whether there is systematic individual variation across the different types of 
inferences. Experimental designs typically compare inferences about the behavior of an actor by 
observers who were told the behavior occurred under one of several different degrees of situational 
constraint (between-subjects). The four common types of inferences examined include the attitude of 
essay writers who either chose which essay position to write or were assigned to a position, the 
emotionality of an interviewee who discussed either anxiety provoking or mundane topics, the abilities of 
game players assigned roles with different levels of difficulty, or the morality of a person who acted 
immorally either because she chose to or was instructed to by an influencer (Gawronski 2004). It is yet to 
be demonstrated whether observers who are more prone to making correspondent inferences for one type 
of judgmental task or target are prone to make correspondent inferences across this variety of judgmental 
tasks and targets.  
In this paper we adopt a psychometric approach to the analysis of the propensity to make 
correspondent inferences. To examine whether the propensity to make correspondent inferences is a 
unique construct and a stable individual difference, we developed and validated an instrument that 
combines the four paradigms most commonly used to assess correspondence bias, taking into account 
different types of dispositions—attitudes, abilities, emotionality, and morality. Our first three studies (1A, 
1B, and 2) develop a new individual-difference measure (i.e., Neglect of External Demands scale, or 
NED1) designed to assess the extent to which a person makes correspondent inferences across varied 
judgmental tasks and targets, evaluate the reliability and the dimensionality of the instrument, and verify 
its factorial structure and discriminant validity.  
In Studies 3, 4, 5A, 5B, 6 and 7 we then tested the extent to which the propensity to make 
correspondent inferences predicted consequential, conceptually related, but different judgments and 
decisions. In Study 3, we examined the relationship between the propensity to make correspondent 
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inferences and attributions of blame to actors for having accidentally harmed another person. In Study 4, 
we examined whether people who are more prone to make correspondent inferences are less likely to 
account for coercion in confessions when judging guilt. In Studies 5A and 5B, we investigated whether 
the propensity to make correspondent inferences is associated with neglecting job difficulty when 
evaluating the performance of employees for promotion, even when information on job difficulty is 
readily accessible. In Study 6, we tested whether high propensity to make correspondent inferences 
increases the odds of selecting personnel whose prior role provided them with an unfair advantage 
relative to personnel whose prior role placed them at an unfair disadvantage. In Study 7, we examined 
whether high propensity to make correspondent inferences induces investors to neglect the overall 
performance of the market when evaluating fund performance and making incentive-compatible 
investment decisions. Together, the studies and instrument elucidate the structure of the construct and the 
extent to which it predicts consequential social judgments faced by professionals in managerial contexts 
and their personal life. Finally, in Study 8 we examined whether those identified as most prone to 
correspondent inference-making can benefit from making situational information easier to process, a 
debiasing intervention that should help them correct for the influence of the situation in their attributions. 
All data and analysis code is hosted on the Open Science Framework at osf.io/dbjtz/. 
 
STUDY 1A 
In Study 1A, we generated and tested numerous scale items through a purification process. The 
result of this process is a 10-item scale measuring the propensity to make correspondent inferences, the 
Neglect of External Demands (i.e., NED) scale, that has good reliability and stability. We used an item-
generation process to capture a broad sense of the construct. We reviewed the literature on correspondent 
inferences, correspondence bias, and the fundamental attribution error, identifying the classic paradigms 
used to assess the bias: the attitude attribution paradigm (Jones and Harris 1967), the quizmaster paradigm 
(Ross et al. 1977), the silent interview paradigm (Snyder and Frankel 1976), and the moral attribution 
paradigm (Bierbrauer 1979).  
Given the common process underlying the different paradigms, we treated the propensity to make 
correspondent inferences construct as a latent variable that leads observers to underweight situational 
constraints across different types of causal attributions. Accordingly, we approached the 
conceptualization and the operationalization of the construct as a reflective measurement model (Bollen 
and Lennox 1991, Edwards and Bagozzi 2000): A model in which the direction of causality is from the 
construct to the indicators, where changes in the underlying construct are hypothesized to cause changes 
in the indicators. Accordingly, changes in individual propensity to make correspondent inferences (i.e., a 
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latent variable), should cause changes in the extent to which observers exhibit confidence in dispositional 
attributions for the behavior of actors across different targets, contexts, and behaviors. 
Method 
Participants  
One hundred and fifty residents of the United States (89 women; Mage = 32.6 years, SD = 11.7) 
received $1 for completing a survey administered through Amazon Mechanical Turk2 (AMT). 
Participants were 82.7% White, 7.3% Asian, 4.7% African American, 4.0% multiracial, and 1.3% Native 
American. Sample size was determined in advance for all studies reported3. No participants were 
excluded. Participation in any study reported here resulted in ineligibility for participation in subsequent 
studies (i.e., no person participated in more than one study).  
Materials  
Item Generation. To develop and select items to include in the scale, we identified existing 
paradigms used to assess correspondence bias in the literature: the attitude attribution paradigm (Jones 
and Harris 1967), the quizmaster paradigm (Ross et al. 1977), the silent interview paradigm (Snyder and 
Frankel 1976), and the moral attribution paradigm (Bierbrauer 1979). We then developed a pool of 
questions by varying some aspects of the situation described, adapting each paradigm to a uniform 
question format. Specifically, each question described an instance of behavior and participants rated their 
confidence in a dispositional attribution for that behavior on a 7-point scale with endpoints, Not at all 
confident (1) and Very confident (7). The pool of questions generated was then submitted to a sample of 
respondents to be purified. An example item based on Jones and Harris’ (1967) attitude attribution 
paradigm appears below.  
 
A struggling freelance writer finally lands her first paid gig. Her employer, a political magazine, 
assigns her to write a piece advocating for the election of Senator Smith. Her feature story 
focuses on these three issues: 1) Senator Smith is backing legislation to spur job creation in 
certain sectors; 2) Senator Smith is committed to reducing America’s dependence on foreign oil; 
and 3) Senator Smith is supporting tax cuts for small businesses.  
 
Based on the information provided, how confident are you that the writer supports Senator 
Smith? (1 = Not at all confident; 7 = Very confident) 
 
Procedure 
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Participants completed 36 unique items designed to assess different forms of correspondent 
inferences. Item order was random. Afterwards, participants reported their age, gender, and ethnicity.  
Results 
Purification. We first reduced the number of items to improve the psychometric properties and 
maximize the usability of the scale. In the interest of parsimony, we initially removed items that were too 
similar (e.g., that assessed the same underlying disposition). We then computed the correlations between 
each item and the rest of the scale, and removed items with item-to-total correlations lower than .40. This 
purification process led to a final 10-item scale (see Table 1 for all items and paradigms). 
 Reliability. The 10-item NED scale showed high reliability (α = .83), well above the acceptable 
threshold of .70 (Nunnally 1978). All items appeared to be worth retention. No question eliminations 
yielded a higher value of the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (α-if-item-deletedi < α). Forty-four of the 45 
pairwise correlations between the items were positive and significant (p < .05). One was positive and 
marginally significant (p = .055). The correlation matrix is reported in Table 2. The average pairwise 
correlation between items was .32. Finally, each item correlated well with the scale, as signaled by an 
average item-to-total correlation equal to .51. All further analyses, in this and subsequent studies, use this 
10-item scale. 
Exploratory factor analysis. We submitted the 10 NED scale items to an exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) followed by a parallel analysis (Horn 1965). Parallel analysis, one of the most accurate 
methods for determining the number of factors to retain (Velicer et al. 2000, Zwick and Velicer 1986), 
involves the construction of several correlation matrices of random variables based on the same sample 
size and number of variables in the actual data. The average eigenvalues from the random correlation 
matrices are then compared to the eigenvalues from the actual correlation matrix. The analysis suggests 
the retention of factors as long as their actual eigenvalues are greater than the parallel average eigenvalues 
from the random correlation matrices  (Glorfeld 1995, Horn 1965, Zwick and Velicer 1986). The parallel 
analysis suggested an underlying single-factor structure, with only the first eigenvalue observed in the 
data being higher than a parallel average random eigenvalue based on the same sample size and number 
of variables (see Figure 1 for a plot of the observed eigenvalues and the parallel random eigenvalues).  In 
the single-factor model, all 10 items loaded onto a single factor accounting for 39.6% of the total 
variance, and each item had a high correlation with that factor (all λs > .44). Items and their factor 
loadings are reported in Table 3.  
 
Discussion 
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The results suggest that the tendency to make correspondent inferences adheres to a single-factor 
structure across a variety of judgments and targets. Moreover, the high inter-item correlations and factors 
loadings suggest that there are individual differences in the propensity to make correspondent inferences. 
Some people have a higher propensity to make correspondent inferences that makes them more confident 
in dispositional attributions for observed behaviors across different judgments, targets, and situations. A 
10-item NED scale was purified and a measurement model was specified. The results of this first study 
suggest that the NED reliably assesses the propensity to make correspondent inferences construct, and it 
captures the single latent variable proposed by our construct operationalization.  
STUDY 1B 
In Study 1B, we verified the factorial structure of the NED by submitting the 10 scale items to a 
confirmatory factor analysis with a new sample of participants. In addition, we tested the stability of the 
scale over time by conducting a second administration of the scale to a subsample of those same 
participants after a three-week lag. 
Method 
Participants 
Initial Sample. One hundred and fifty-one residents of the United States (64 women; Mage = 30.4 
years, SD = 10.7) received $1 for completing a survey administered through AMT. Participants were 
80.8% White, 6.6% African American, 6.0% Asian, 4.0% multiracial, .7% Native American, and 2.0% 
did not indicate their ethnicity.  
Follow-Up Sample. To assess the test-retest reliability of the instrument, all participants in the 
initial sample received an invitation to retake the survey for an additional $1 three weeks after the initial 
administration. People who were not part of the initial sample were not able to access the survey. 
Seventy-five participants retook the survey (33 women; Mage = 31.2 years, SD = 10.7) yielding a 50% 
retention rate. Participants in this subsample were 78.7% White, 9.3% African American, 5.3% 
multiracial, 5.3% Asian, and 1.3% did not indicate their ethnicity. There were no differences between the 
initial sample and the follow-up sample in terms of age, F(1,149) = .86, p = .36, gender, χ2 (1)= .16, p = 
.69, or ethnicity, χ2 (3) = 2.50, p = .48. 
Procedure 
Participants first completed the 10-item NED, with items presented in a random order. In 
addition, participants reported their age, gender, ethnicity, highest level of education completed, and 
approximate household yearly income before taxes on a 6-point scale (i.e., 1 = under $25,000; 2 
=$25,001- $49,999; 3 = $50,000 - $74,999; 4 = $75,000 - $99,999; 5 = $100,000 -$149,999; 6 = $150,000 
and over). We assessed test-retest reliability of the NED by sending all participants an invitation to 
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complete the questionnaire again three weeks after the initial administration through the AMT messaging 
system. Test items were again presented in a random order. Participants were given three days to 
complete the survey, after which they could no longer access it. 
Results and Discussion 
Confirmatory factor analysis. To test the factorial structure that emerged in the exploratory 
factor analysis in Study 1A, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). We first evaluated the 
assumption of multivariate normality of the data, which is a necessary condition for the use of maximum 
likelihood estimation. Mardia’s test of multivariate skewness and kurtosis was significant (χ2 = 439.55, p 
< .001), signaling that the assumption of multivariate normality of the data was violated. As a 
consequence we opted for a robust maximum likelihood estimation (RML). The CFA suggested that the 
single-factor model emerged in the exploratory factor analysis from Study 1A fits the data in Study 1B 
well, with a goodness-of-fit index (GFI) of .94, a Bentler’s Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of .97, a non-
normed fit index of .96 (NNFI), and a root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) of .05. Those 
values indicate a good fit between the model and the observed data. The factor-loading estimates are 
reported in Table 4 and were all significant, all ts > 4.9, all ps < .0001. 
Test-Retest Reliability. To assess test-retest reliability, we computed NED scores on the data 
collected in the second administration of the scale on participants in Study 1B (α = .74), and examined the 
correlation between NED scores in the first (α = .70) and in the second administration, r(73) = .73, p < 
.001. The high correlation signaled the stability of the NED scale over time.  
Descriptive Statistics. We examined the distribution of the NED scores. The scores were 
normally distributed (M = 4.08, SD = 1.02), as both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, z = .06, p = .20, and 
the Shapiro-Wilks test, z = .99, p = .16, were not significant, and the observed range spanned from 1.40 to 
7.00 (see Figure 2).  
We then examined whether demographic variables accounted for some differences in NED 
scores. Gender appeared to be unrelated to the propensity to make correspondent inferences. The scores 
of male (M = 4.14, SD = .99) and female participants (M = 3.99, SD = 1.06) were not significantly 
different, F < 1. Similarly, the correlation between age and NED scores was not significant, r(149) = .04, 
p = .59. Also, ethnicity did not appear to be associated with different levels of NED scores, F(3, 143) = 
.32, p = .81. Education achieved was negatively and significantly correlated with NED scores, r(148)4 = -
.21, p = .011, suggesting that higher levels of education were associated with lower propensity to make 
correspondent inferences. Personal income was also negatively and significantly correlated with NED 
scores, r(146)5 = -.21, p = .01, suggesting that higher levels of income were associated with lower 
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propensity to make correspondent inferences, although the underlying direction and nature of this 
relationship would be difficult to ascertain.  
Discussion 
The results suggest that the propensity to make correspondent inferences is a latent, 
unidimensional construct. Furthermore, the high test-retest reliability observed indicated that the 
individual difference tapped by our NED scale enjoys a good level of stability over time. NED scores 
were not affected by demographic variables such as gender, age, and ethnicity, but did tend to decrease as 
the level of education and income increased. In the next study, we test the discriminant validity of the 
NED in relation to several established scales measuring potentially related psychological constructs. 
 
STUDY 2 
The development of a valid and reliable measurement scale introduces the possibility to clarify 
the relationships between the propensity to make correspondent inferences and related constructs that 
compose its nomological network (Cronbach and Meehl 1955). Using seven different samples of 
respondents we examined the discriminant validity of the NED scale in relation to 21 established 
measures of potentially related psychological constructs including measures of intelligence, inclination 
toward cognitive activities (i.e., SAT scores, Decision Making Competence, Cognitive Reflection Test 
scores, and Need for Cognition), measures of cognitive processing preferences (i.e., Need for Precision, 
Need to Evaluate, and Need for Cognitive Closure), measures of attributional style, psychological 
constructs that assess traits related to causality (i.e., Locus of Control, and Desirability of Control), and 
personality traits (i.e., the Big Five Inventory; BFI). These comparisons determine whether individual 
differences in the propensity to make correspondent inferences simply reflect individual differences in 
more basic individual differences or established personality traits.  
 
Method 
Participants  
One thousand and seventy-four participants were recruited in seven unique samples (598 women; 
Mage = 31.8 years, SD = 11.3). For each sample, the content of the questionnaire varied. All participants 
were residents of the United States who received $1 or $2 (Sample 1) for completing a survey 
administered through AMT. Participants were 79.5% White, 6.1% African American, 6.3% Asian, 4.6% 
multiracial, 1.3% Native American, and 2.1% did not indicate their ethnicity. The seven samples did not 
differ in terms of NED scores, F(5, 1067) = .83, p = .55, no participant was included in more than one 
sample, and no participant took part in previous or subsequent studies.  
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Materials and Procedure 
Sample 1. Participants (n = 121) first completed the 10-item NED with items presented in a 
random order. Then they were administered the Adult Decision Making Competence inventory (A-DMC; 
Bruine de Bruin et al. 2007), a comprehensive instrument to assess people’s ability to make judgments 
and decisions. Participants completed the six behavioral decision making batteries of measures 
composing the A-DMC: Resistance to Framing (14 paired items), which measures whether value 
assessment is affected by irrelevant variations in problem descriptions; Recognizing Social Norms, which 
measures how well people assess peer social norms (16 items); Under/Overconfidence, which measures 
how well participants recognize the extent of their own knowledge (34 items); Applying Decision Rules, 
which asks participants to indicate, for hypothetical individual consumers using different decision rules, 
which products they would buy out of a choice set (10 items); Consistency in Risk Perception, which 
measures the ability to follow probability rules (16 paired items); and Resistance to Sunk Costs, which 
measures the ability to ignore prior investments when making decisions (10 items)6. Both the order of the 
batteries and the order of the items were randomized, with scale items nested within battery. Participants 
also reported their scores on the math and verbal sections of the SAT if they had taken the SAT. In order 
to facilitate the accuracy of participants who might have taken the test several years before, participants 
reported approximate SAT scores on two 12-point scales increasing in 50-point increments from 200-249 
to 750-800.  
Sample 2. Participants (n = 101) first completed the 10-item NED with items presented in a 
random order. They then completed the original three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick 
2005) in open-ended format. Given the diffusion of the three original CRT on AMT and the ease of 
retrieving the solution to those three questions, participants were also administered nine additional and 
less common CRT questions (Frederick, personal communication) resulting in a total of 12 CRT items.  
Sample 3. Participants (n = 200) first completed the 10-item NED with items presented in a 
random order. Then they completed the BFI (44 items; John and Srivastava 1999). As in Sample 1, 
participants who took the SAT reported their scores. 
Sample 4. Participants (n = 199) first completed the 10-item NED with items presented in a 
random order. Then they completed a series of personality scales: the Need for Cognition scale (NFC, 18 
items; Cacioppo et al. 1984), the Need for Precision scale (20 items; Viswanatian 1997), the Need to 
Evaluate Scale (16 items; Jarvis and Petty 1996), the Desirability of Control scale (20 items; Burger and 
Cooper 1979), and the BFI (44 items; John and Srivastava 1999). Each scale was administered using its 
original answer format and coding scheme. Both the order of the scales and the order of the items were 
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randomized, with scale items nested within scale. As in Sample 1 and 3, participants who took the SAT 
reported their scores.  
Sample 5. Participants (n = 150) first completed the 10-item NED with items presented in a 
random order. Then they completed the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al. 1982). 
The questionnaire asks to indicate the major causes of 12 events, and to rate these causes on four 
dimensions: internality, stability, and globality. Each scale was administered using its original answer 
format and coding scheme. The order of the events was random, while the order of the three rating 
dimensions was the same for all the events. As in Samples 1, 3, and 4, participants who took the SAT 
reported their scores. 
Sample 6. Participants (n = 151) first completed the 10-item NED with items presented in a 
random order. Then they completed the Locus of Control scale (LOC, 23 items; Rotter 1966), in its 
original answer format and coding scheme, with the items presented in a random order.  
Sample 7. Participants (n = 152) first completed the 10-item NED with items presented in a 
random order. Then they completed the Need for Cognitive Closure scale (NCC, 42 items; Webster and 
Kruglanski 1994), in its original answer format and coding scheme, with the items in randomized order. 
As in Samples 1, 3, 4, and 5, participants who took the SAT reported their scores. 
Results 
For each of the samples we computed NED scores (all αs ≥ .78 and ≤ .82). For each of the 
constructs that were measured using multi-item scales we computed an overall average score after reverse 
scoring appropriate items, and we examined the correlations of these scores with NED scores. Table 5 
presents the scales and measures, their Cronbach’s alpha coefficients, and their zero-order correlations 
with the NED scale.  
 
Intelligence, cognitive ability, cognitive reflection, and cognitive processing preferences.  
Given the inferential correction structure of correspondence bias, we assessed whether a greater 
propensity to make correspondent inferences merely reflects poor cognitive ability. If the propensity to 
make correspondent inferences merely reflects poor cognitive ability, we should observe high negative 
correlations between NED scores and measures of intelligence, decision making ability, cognitive 
reflection, and inclination toward cognitive activities.  
SAT scores are frequently used as a measure of intelligence, as both the verbal and math scores 
load highly on psychometric g or general intelligence (Brodnick and Ree 1995, Frey and Detterman 2004, 
Unsworth and Engle 2007). Out of the 822 participants who were administered the question, 412 reported 
their SAT test scores. We computed the correlation between the reported approximate SAT scores (both 
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verbal and math) and NED scores. Both the correlation between NED scores and the verbal and math 
SAT scores were negative and significant, r(410) = -.12, p = .02, and r(410) = -.13, p = .01, respectively. 
These results suggest that propensity to make correspondent inferences is greater at lower levels of 
intelligence, but the small size of the correlation coefficients suggests that the construct is distinct from 
general intelligence.  
Second, we examined the correlation between NED scores and general decision making 
competence, measured using the six A-DMC inventory tasks: Resistance to Framing (α = .46); 
Recognizing Social norms (αY/N = .73, α% = .85); Under/overconfidence (α% = .86); Applying Decision 
Rules (α = .61); Consistency in Risk Perception (α = .73); and Resistance to Sunk Costs (α = .53). These 
levels of reliability were generally consistent with those reported by Bruine de Bruin and colleagues 
(2007). NED scores were significantly correlated with three of the A-DMC components: applying 
decision rules, r(119) = -.21, p = .02, consistency in risk perception, r(119) = -.19, p = .04, and resistance 
to sunk costs, r(119) = -.21, p = .02. NED scores were not correlated with the other three components: 
resistance to framing, recognizing social norms, and under/overconfidence, all rs < |.10|, ps > .28. The 
small size of the significant coefficients suggests that the propensity to make correspondent inferences 
and the dimensions of decision making ability measured by the A-DMC are independent constructs. Most 
important, the lack of a correlation with overconfidence suggests that the confidence exhibited in 
dispositional attributions on the NED does not merely reflect a general tendency to be overconfident.   
Third, we examined whether high NED scores are associated with a higher reliance on intuition 
than on deliberate reasoning by examining their correlation with scores on the CRT, a set of questions that 
each have an incorrect intuitive response and a correct response that can be reached through deliberate 
reasoning (Frederick 2005). We computed a composite measure of performance on the CRT by assigning 
a score of 1 to each correct answer, a score of 0 to each incorrect answer, and summing all items (M = 
3.50, SD = 2.65). NED scores were significantly and negatively correlated with CRT scores and this 
pattern of correlations was consistent irrespective of which CRT items are considered: all 12 items: r = -
.31, p = .002, the 3 “original” items: r = -.24, p = .015, or the 9 “new” items r = -.30 p = .002.  We also 
computed a composite measure of reliance on intuition, by assigning a score of 1 to each instance in 
which participants gave the incorrect ‘intuitive’ answer to a CRT item, a score of 0 to any other answer, 
and summing up all items (M = 4.17, SD = 2.32). NED scores were significantly and positively correlated 
with CRT intuitive answering scores, r(99) = .23, p = .02. This pattern of correlations was consistent also 
considering only the 3 “original” items, r = .22 p = .03, or the 9 “new” items, r = .18, p = .07.  
Participants more prone to make correspondent inferences were more likely to rely on their 
intuition and less likely to engage in cognitive reflection and deliberation, consistently with an inferential 
correction process underlying correspondence bias. The size of the correlation between cognitive 
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reflection and NED scores, however, was low enough to suggest that although the propensity to make 
correspondent inferences is associated with lower cognitive reflection, it is not simply a manifestation of 
it.  
Fourth, we examined the correlation between NED scores and self-reported inclination toward 
cognitive activities, NFC. People high in NFC tend to put more effort into processing information and 
have been found to exhibit less correspondence bias in previous research, as they are more likely to 
exhibit situational correction than people low in NFC (D'Agostino and Fincher-Kiefer 1992). In line with 
this finding, we observed a significant and negative correlation between NED scores and NFC, r(197) = -
.21, p < .01, however, the small size of the correlation coefficient signals the conceptual discrimination of 
the two constructs.  
In addition to these standard measures of cognitive ability and motivation, we examined the 
relationship between the NED and two scales measuring chronic cognitive processing preferences. The 
Need to Evaluate scale assesses the tendency of individuals to form evaluative responses about situations 
and objects by measuring chronic differences in the likelihood and in the extent of evaluative responding 
(Jarvis and Petty 1996). Since both dispositional attributions and situational attributions may be 
considered as manifestation of a need to evaluate, we expected this construct to be independent from the 
propensity to make correspondent inferences. In line with this prediction, the correlation between NED 
scores and need to evaluate was not significant, r(197) = .01, p = .87.  
The Need for Precision scale measures individual preference toward more precise or fine-grained 
modes of processing (Viswanatian 1997). One might argue that correspondent inferences are the mere 
manifestation of low need for precision, which induces people to use general dispositional information 
rather than precise and individuating situational information to characterize behavior. The correlation 
between NED scores and need for precision was negative, but did not reach statistical significance, r(197) 
= -.07, p = .36, signaling the conceptual discrimination of the two constructs. 
Finally, we examined the relationship between the NED and Need for Cognitive Closure 
(Webster and Kruglanski 1994), a personality trait that measures the extent to which a person faced with a 
judgment desires any answer as compared with confusion and ambiguity (Kruglanski 1989). NCC is a 
multidimensional construct composed by five sub dimensions: preference for order and structure, 
discomfort with ambiguity (i.e., the discomfort experienced when lacking closure), preference for 
predictability (i.e., the desire for knowledge that can be relied on across different circumstances), 
decisiveness (i.e., the experience of a urgent desire to reach closure), and closed-mindedness (i.e., the 
unwillingness to have one’s knowledge confronted by alternative opinions or inconsistent evidence). 
NCC may be associated with higher propensity to make correspondent inferences, because one may argue 
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that people high in need for cognitive closure are more likely to stop their deliberation before having 
taken situational factors into account (Webster 1993), consistently with the positive correlation we 
observed, r(150) = .19, p = .02. 
Dimensions of control 
People may draw correspondent inferences because they have a chronic preference for control. 
Their preference may engender a belief that others have control over situational factors, for example, and 
that behaviors are more likely to be driven by dispositions than by the situation. We measured preference 
for control using the desirability of control scale (Burger and Cooper 1979), and the locus of control scale 
(Rotter 1966). The desirability of control scale measures a desire to have control over the events in one’s 
life. The locus of control scale measures individual perceptions of personal control. Internal locus of 
control, indicated by low locus of control scores, corresponds to the belief that one has control over one’s 
life. External locus of control, indicated by high locus of control scores, refers to the belief that external 
forces influence one’s life circumstances. The correlation between NED scores and desirability of control 
was positive and marginally significant, r(197) =.12, p = .098, whereas the correlation with locus of 
control was not significant, r(149) = .02, p = .81. 
Big five personality traits 
For each of the Big Five personality traits, we computed an overall average score after reverse 
scoring appropriate items. NED scores were significantly correlated with Agreeableness, r(397) = .19, p 
< .001, and Extraversion, r(397) = .11, p = .03, and uncorrelated with Conscientiousness, r(397) = .08, p 
= .14, Openness to Experience, r(397) = -.06, p = .27, and Neuroticism, r(397) = -.08, p = .12. The small 
size of the significant correlations suggests that the NED scale is sufficiently discriminated from these 
dimensions of personality. 
Attributional style 
We also examined the correlation between the NED and the ASQ, a measure of attributional style 
developed in order to predict the occurrence of depression (Peterson et al. 1982). The ASQ measures 
individual differences in the tendency to attribute the causes of good and bad events to internal (vs. 
external), stable (vs. unstable), and global (vs. specific) factors (Abramson et al. 1978). Participants 
generated a cause for each of six positive and six negative events that might occur to them (e.g., 
becoming very rich, going on a date that goes badly, looking for a job unsuccessfully) and rated each 
cause along scales corresponding to internal, stable, and global dimensions. We computed average scores 
on each of the three dimensions and examined their correlation with NED scores. High average scores on 
the three dimensions of the ASQ correspond to high internal attribution, high stability, and high globality, 
respectively. NED scores were significantly correlated with internality scores, r(148) = .22, p = .001, 
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suggesting that the tendency to make dispositional attributions tends to apply both to the self and to other 
people. However, both the correlation between NED scores and stability, r(148) = -.05, p = .58, and the 
correlation between NED scores and globality were not significant, r(148) = .04, p = .67, signaling the 
independence of the propensity to make correspondent inferences from these constructs. 
Discussion 
The propensity to make correspondent inferences as measured by the NED does not appear to be 
a derivative of general intelligence, decision making ability, cognitive processing styles, preferences and 
beliefs about control, personality traits, or attributional style. Most important, the small size of all the 
significant correlation coefficients observed in Study 2 suggests that the NED measures a distinct 
construct, supporting its discriminant validity. There were interesting significant correlations with related 
constructs in directions that would be predicted by an inferential correction model of correspondence bias: 
Participants more prone to correspondent inferences were characterized by significantly lower 
intelligence scores, lower decision making competence on some dimensions (i.e., applying decision rules, 
consistency in risk perceptions, and resistance to sunk costs), lower propensity to engage in cognitive 
reflection, lower need for cognitions scores, and higher need for cognitive closure scores. The significant 
and positive correlation between NED scores and the internality dimension of the attributional style 
questionnaire provides proof of its convergent validity. Perhaps worth examination by future research, the 
propensity to make correspondent inferences showed positive and significant correlations with personality 
traits such as extraversion, agreeableness, and desirability of control. 
   
STUDIES 3-7: PREDICTIVE VALIDITY 
Studies 3, 4, 5A, 5B, 6, and 7 tested the predictive validity of the NED, its ability to predict 
judgments and behaviors influenced by the propensity to make correspondent inferences. Studies 3 and 4 
examined the relationship between NED scores and attributions of blame and guilt. Specifically, Study 3 
tested the relationship between NED scores and attributions of blame to actors who accidentally harmed 
another person. Study 4 tested whether high NED scores correspond to a greater propensity to believe that 
defendants who made confessions under coercive circumstances are guilty of the crimes to which they 
confessed.  
Studies 5A and 5B, 6, and 7 examined the relationship between NED scores and attributions of 
ability and performance. Studies 5A and 5B tested the effect of the NED in predicting the weight given to 
task difficulty when evaluating the performance of employees for promotion. Studies 6 and 7 examined 
the effects of the NED on behavioral outcomes. Study 6 tested whether higher NED scores predicted a 
tendency to ignore the advantages and disadvantages imposed by previous roles on candidates when 
Correspondence Bias: Measurement, Consequences, and Correction 21 
selecting which one would exhibit superior future performance. Study 7 tested whether higher NED 
scores would be associated with less discounting for market forces when evaluating investment 
performances and making incentive-compatible investment decisions.  
 
STUDY 3: CORRESPONDENT INFERENCES AND ATTRIBUTING BLAME  
We first examined whether the propensity to make correspondent inferences predicts the amount 
of blame observers attribute to people who accidentally harm another person. Specifically, we compared 
scenarios in which an actor was causing negligent or accidental harm, with the expectation that 
participants with a greater propensity to make correspondent inferences would be more likely to attribute 
blame to the actor, even in cases of accidental harm, in which they should take into account the impact of 
situational factors.  
Method 
Participants 
Two hundreds residents of the United States (106 women; Mage = 30.6 years, SD = 10.7) received 
$1 for completing a survey administered through AMT. Participants were 78.5% White, 9.0% African 
American, 5.0% multiracial, 2.5 % Asian, 1.5% Native American, and 3.5% did not indicate their 
ethnicity.  
Materials and procedure 
Participants completed the 10-item NED with items presented in a random order. The stimuli 
used for the blame attribution judgments were a set of 24 scenarios describing a moral situation adapted 
from Young and Saxe (2009). Each participant saw one of two versions of each scenario: A version in 
which the protagonist caused negligent harm to a person (harm stemming from the failure of the 
protagonist to use reasonable care), or a version in which the protagonist caused accidental harm to the 
same person. In both versions of the scenario the background information and the harm caused (outcome) 
were the same. An example appears below: 
 
Background information: Mitch and his colleagues are at a new sushi restaurant close to their ofﬁce. 
Mitch happens to know the owner of the restaurant through a mutual friend. 
 
Negligent harm version: Mitch thinks that the tuna isn't very fresh after hearing his friend complain 
about it. Mitch thinks everyone should avoid the tuna in case of parasites. 
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Accidental harm version: Mitch thinks the tuna is especially excellent, after hearing his friend rave 
about it. Mitch thinks anyone who likes tuna should order the tuna here. 
 
Outcome: Mitch recommends the tuna to his colleagues at the table. One of his colleagues orders the 
tuna and ends up getting a nasty strain of parasites. 
 
Each participant read 24 scenarios of which 12 involved negligent harm and 12 involved 
accidental harm. The order of the scenarios was random. After reading each scenario, participants 
evaluated the extent to which they believed the protagonist was blameworthy for causing harm on a 5-
point scale (1 = not at all; 5 =extremely). Finally, participants reported their age, gender, and ethnicity. 
Results and discussion 
NED scores were computed by averaging across the 10 items (α = .80). A mixed model analysis 
was used to estimate the effect of propensity to make correspondent inferences, type of scenario 
(accidental harm vs. negligent harm), and their interaction on attributions of blame, controlling for the set 
of scenarios that participants were administered. Since each participant provided attributions of blame for 
both accidental and negligent harm scenarios, we let the intercept vary randomly to take into account the 
lack of independence between the observations. We estimated the following model: !"!" =  !! +  !!!"#! + !!!"! +  !!!"#! ∗ !"! + !!!"#! +  !!! + !!" 
where Bl refers to blame rating, index i refers to participants and index j refers to the scenario 
evaluated. The dependent variable was thus the blame judgment expressed by each participant on each 
scenario. The explanatory variables were each participant’s mean-centered NED score (NEDi), the type of 
scenario dummy (0 = accidental harm vs. 1 = negligent harm, Scj), the interaction between these two 
variables, a dummy indicating which set of 24 scenarios each participant evaluated (Seti), and U0i 
indicated each participant’s random effect. Results are based on a total of 4800 observations, where each 
observation is a blame judgment provided by a participant.  
The results revealed a significant effect of propensity to make correspondent inferences, β1 = 
.265, SE = .033, t = 8.02, p < .001, a significant effect of type of scenario, β2 = 1.57, SE = .032, t = 49.15, 
p < .001, and a significant interaction between propensity to make correspondent inferences and type of 
scenario (accidental harm versus negligent harm) on attributions of blame, β3 = -.16, SE = .030, t = -5.39, 
p < .001, controlling for the set of scenarios evaluated. Table 6 reports the results of this estimation and 
the comparison of this model with an alternative model that includes only the main effects.   
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The significant interaction between propensity to make correspondent inferences and type of 
scenario was further explored by examining the simple slopes of the type of scenario at all levels of 
propensity to make correspondent inferences (Preacher et al. 2006). The results revealed that propensity 
to make correspondent inferences was associated with higher attributions of blame for negligent harm, β 
= .106, SE = .033, z = 3.20, p = .001 but also, and more strongly so, with attributions of blame for 
accidental harm, β = .265, SE = .033, z = 8.02, p < .001 (see Figure 3). 
In sum, participants characterized by high propensity to make correspondent inferences were 
more likely to make dispositional attributions to actors for harmful events when the harm was due to the 
their negligence. Moreover, this relationship was even stronger when the outcome was purely 
accidental—when participants should have discounted more for situational factors contributing to that 
harm. The results provide evidence of the predictive validity of the NED with respect to attributions of 
blame. 
 
STUDY 4: CORRESPONDENT INFERENCES AND COERCED CONFESSIONS 
In a second test of the predictive validity of the NED, we examined whether the propensity to 
make correspondent inferences predicts the extent to which judgments of guilt in mock juror verdicts are 
affected by confessions obtained under coercion. We expected that participants more prone to make 
correspondent inferences should be less likely to take into account the situational influences that may 
have induced a defendant to confess, and therefore should be more likely to consider a forced confession 
to be a relevant piece of evidence in forming their judgment. As a consequence, they should be more 
likely to consider a defendant who confessed to be guilty even when his confession was obtained under 
coercion and then withdrawn.  
Participants 
One hundred and thirty residents of the United States (51 women; Mage = 28.98 years, SD = 8.4) 
received $1 for completing a survey administered through AMT. Participants were 76.2% White, 8.5 % 
Asian, 6.2% African American, 5.0% multiracial, 1.6% Native American, and 3.1% did not indicate their 
ethnicity.  
Materials and procedure 
Participants completed the 10-item NED, with items presented in a random order. Next, they read 
a summary of an aggravated assault trial (adapted from Kassin and Neumann 1997, see Appendix 1). For 
participants randomly assigned to the coerced confession condition, the trial summary mentioned that a 
confession was obtained after pressuring the defendant for several hours, which was eventually retracted. 
For participants randomly assigned to the control condition, the trial summary was identical but there was 
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no mention of the confession or its retraction. After reading the trial summary, participants imagined they 
were members of the jury and indicated to what extent they believed the defendant to be guilty on a 7-
point scale (1 = Definitely not guilty; 7 = Definitely guilty). Finally, participants reported their age, 
gender, and ethnicity. 
 
Results and discussion 
We predicted that information on a confession obtained under coercion would increase the 
likelihood that participants more prone to make correspondent inferences would consider the defendant to 
be guilty, as the judgment requires correcting for situational pressures. This prediction was tested using 
the procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991) to decompose the predicted interaction using 
regression analysis.  
NED scores were computed by averaging across the 10 items (α = .81). Guilt ratings were 
regressed on the type of scenario dummy (1 = coerced confession; 0 = control), mean-centered NED 
scores, and the interaction between these two variables. The analysis revealed a significant interaction 
between the type of scenario and propensity to make correspondent inferences, β = .937, SE = .361, t = 
2.59, p = .01. The effects of type of scenario, β = .071, SE = .383, t = .19, p = .85, and of propensity to 
make correspondent inferences, β = -.039, SE = .234, t = -.17, p = .87, were not significant. Table 7 
reports the results of this estimation and the comparison of this model with an alternative model that 
includes only the main effects.   
To illuminate the nature of the interaction, we examined the effect of the coerced confession on 
guilt ratings at all levels of propensity to make correspondent inferences using the Johnson-Neyman 
method (Spiller et al. 2013). The analysis revealed two Johnson-Neyman points (see Figure 4), whereby 
the effect of the coerced confession on guilt ratings was positive and significant for participants 
characterized by high propensity to make correspondent inferences (NED > 5.25), but negative and 
significant for participants characterized by low propensity to make correspondent inferences (NED < 
2.74).  
The propensity to make correspondent inferences moderated the effect of the coerced confessions 
on guilt ratings. Participants more prone to make correspondent inferences were positively influenced by 
a coerced confession in rating the likelihood that the defendant was guilty. These participants were more 
likely to neglect the situational influences (i.e., the coercion) that may have induced the defendant to 
confess, and therefore may have used the confession as a relevant piece of evidence in forming their 
judgment. Participants less prone to make correspondent inferences showed the opposite effect, as they 
were less likely to consider the defendant guilty in the coerced confession condition than in the control 
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condition. This effect was unexpected, and may be due to the fact that these participants attributed such a 
high weight to the situational factors resulting in the confession that they overcorrected their guilt ratings.  
 
STUDY 5A: CORRESPONDENT INFERENCES AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS  
Study 5A investigated the ability of the NED to predict the weight given to job difficulty when 
evaluating the performance and promotion-worthiness of employees. We used an experimental paradigm 
in which clear and quantified information about the situation was available, so participants could adjust 
their judgments appropriately (Swift et al. 2013). An advantage of this paradigm is that it rules out the 
possibility that participants’ neglect of situational information is simply a consequence of having 
incomplete information about situational constraints (Moore et al. 2010). Participants evaluated twelve 
candidates who were up for promotion to a higher rank position. Individual candidate performance was 
provided, together with information about the difficulty of the situation in which each candidate operated. 
We expected that the propensity to make correspondent inferences would be inversely related to the 
extent that participants adjusted performance evaluations of job candidates for the difficulty of their job, 
even though that information was readily available. 
Method 
Participants  
Two hundred and five residents of the United States (84 women; Mage = 34.67 years, SD = 11.05) 
received $1 for completing a survey administered through AMT. Participants were 76.6% White, 7.8% 
Hispanic, 6.8% African American, 5.9% Asian, .5% Native American, and 2.4% did not indicate their 
ethnicity. They had on average, 14.3 (SD = 9.9) years of work experience and had been involved with an 
average of 2.4 (SD = 4.2) promotion decisions. 
 
Materials and procedure 
Participants completed the 10-item NED with items presented in a random order. All participants 
then read a business scenario in which they were the CEO of an airline deciding whom to promote to a 
senior management position from a set of twelve candidates currently managing different airports (from 
Swift et al. 2013, Study 2). The performance of the candidates was expressed as the percentage of flights 
departing on time from their respective airports over the five years in which they were in charge. 
Participants were told why departure time is a relevant performance indicator and were provided with the 
performance of each airport five years before each candidate arrived. On the basis of this information, 
half of the airports were historically punctual (about 85% of flights departed on time, corresponding to 
low situational difficulty) and half were historically tardy (about 70% of flights departed on time, 
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corresponding to high situational difficulty). The individual performance of the twelve candidates was 
varied such that one third of the candidates performed 5% above the previous average of their respective 
airports, one third at the previous average, and one third 5% below the previous average. These numbers 
were varied by a few tenths of a percentage point to increase the realism of the scenario, as in the original 
study. All the possible combinations between airport and performance were counterbalanced and 
administered in a random order. For each candidate, participants were shown the historical departure time 
performance across ten years: five years preceding the candidate’s appointment and the most recent five 
years under their management. Participants then evaluated each candidate on two items, one related to her 
performance (1 = Very bad; 7 = Very good) and the other to her promotion worthiness (1 = Definitely no; 
7 = Definitely yes). Finally, participants reported their years of work experience, number of promotion 
decisions they had been involved in, and their age, gender, and ethnicity. 
 
Results and discussion 
NED scores were computed by averaging across the 10 items (α = .79). The two items asking 
participants to rate the performance and the promotion worthiness of each candidate were highly 
correlated, r(2445) = .90, p < .001, and were averaged in an overall evaluative index. A mixed model 
analysis was used to estimate the effect of propensity to make correspondent inferences, individual 
performance, performance adjusted for the situational difficulty, and the two-way interactions between 
each of the two performance measures and propensity to make correspondent inferences. Since each 
participant provided evaluations for all the candidates, we let the intercept vary randomly to take into 
account the lack of independence between the observations. We estimated the following model: 
 !"#$!" =  !! +  !!!"#! + !!!"! +  !!!"! +  !!!"#! ∗ !"! + !!!"#! ∗ !"!+ !!! + !!" 
 
where Eval refers to evaluations, index i refers to participants and index j refers to the candidate 
evaluated. The dependent variable was thus the evaluation given by each participant to each candidate. 
The explanatory variables were each participant’s mean-centered NED score (NEDi), the candidates’ 
individual performance scores (on time average in the five years of the candidate’s tenure, IPj), the 
candidates’ performance scores adjusted for the difficulty of the situation (individual performance score 
minus the on time average in the five years prior to the candidate’s appointment, APj), and Ui indicated 
each participant’s random effect. Results are based on a total of 2460 observations, where each 
observation is a candidate evaluation provided by a participant.  
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We predicted that participants more prone to make correspondent inferences would be less 
influenced by adjusted performance (i.e., performance corrected for situational difficulty) when assessing 
candidates. The results supported this prediction, as they revealed a significant and negative interaction 
between NED scores and adjusted performance, β5 = -.055, SE = .006, t = -9.14, p < .001. Interestingly, 
the interaction between NED scores and individual performance was also significant, but positive in sign, 
β4 = .022, SE = .003, t = 7.94, p < .001. Table 8 reports the results of this estimation and the comparison 
of this model with an alternative model that includes only the main effects. The results show that 
propensity to make correspondent inferences affects the extent to which people incorporate information 
about job or task difficulty when evaluating the performance of others. Participants characterized by high 
NED scores were less likely to anchor their performance evaluations on adjusted performance, favoring 
candidates who benefited from easier circumstances. These results are particularly interesting in light of 
the fact that participants were provided with information on the situational difficulty next to information 
on individual performance, and in the same format, suggesting that the NED scale is diagnostic of 
dispositional attributions also in contexts where information on situational factors is available and clear. 
 
STUDY 5B – REPLICATION AND EXTENSION 
Study 5B replicated Study 5A with a different population, undergraduate business majors. In 
addition, it compared the predictive validity of the NED to a standard measure of intelligence (the SAT) 
in its ability to explain variance in performance evaluations that neglected the influence of job difficulty.  
Method 
Participants  
One hundred and nine undergraduate business majors at a large private university in New 
England (49 women; Mage = 19.74 years, SD = .83) received partial course credit for completing the study. 
Participants were 37.9% White, 9.7% Hispanic, 4.9% African American, 35.9% Asian, and 11.7% did not 
indicate their ethnicity. Six participants did not report their SAT scores and could not be included in the 
analysis. Their NED scores were not significantly different from those of the other participants, F(1,107) 
= .23, p = .64.  
 
Materials and procedure 
Participants completed the 10-item NED with items presented in a random order. Afterwards, 
they were administered the same scenario as in study 5A. Finally, they reported their age, gender, 
ethnicity, and scores on the math and verbal sections of the SAT if they had taken the SAT. Scores were 
collected on two 12-point scales increasing in 50-point increments from 200-249 to 750-800.  
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Results and discussion 
NED scores were computed by averaging across the 10 items (α = .79). The two items asking 
participants to rate the performance and the promotion worthiness of each candidate were highly 
correlated, r(1212) = .88, p < .001, and were averaged in an overall evaluative index. A mixed model 
analysis was used to estimate the effect of propensity to make correspondent inferences, individual 
performance, performance adjusted for the situational difficulty, and the two-way interactions between 
each of the two performance measures and propensity to make correspondent inferences. Since each 
participant provided evaluations for all the candidates, we let the intercept vary randomly to take into 
account the lack of independence between the observations. We estimated the following model: 
 !"#$!" =  !! +  !!!"#! + !!!"!!"#$! +  !!!"!!"#$! +  !!!"! +  !!!"! +  !!!"#! ∗ !"! +!!!"#! ∗ !"! +  !!!"#_!"#$! ∗ !"! + !!!"#_!"#$! ∗ !"! + !!"!"#_!"#$! ∗!"! + !!!!"#_!"#$! ∗ !"!+ !!! + !!"  
 
where Eval refers to evaluations, index i refers to participants and index j refers to the candidate 
evaluated. The dependent variable was thus the evaluation given by each participant to each candidate. 
The explanatory variables were each participant’s mean-centered NED score (NEDi), SAT math score 
(SAT_MATHi), SAT verbal score (SAT_VERBALi), the candidates’ individual performance scores (on 
time average in the five years of the candidate’s tenure, IPj), the candidates’ performance scores adjusted 
for the difficulty of the situation (individual performance score minus the on time average in the five 
years prior to the candidate’s appointment, APj), and U0i indicated each participant’s random effect. 
Results are based on a total of 1227 observations, where each observation is a candidate evaluation 
provided by a participant (the total number of observations would have been 1236 but nine candidate 
ratings were missing).  
Most important, the significant and negative interaction between NED scores and adjusted 
performance was replicated in Study 5B, β7 = -.034, SE = .012, t = -2.71, p = .007. By contrast, the 
interaction between SAT math scores and adjusted performance, β9 = .0003, SE = .0002, t = 1.72, p = .09, 
and the interaction between SAT verbal scores and adjusted performance, β11 = .0003, SE = .0002, t = 
1.85, p = .06, were only marginally significant. Table 9 reports the results of this estimation and the 
comparison of this model with an alternative model that includes only the main effects, and an alternative 
model that includes only the interactions between the two performance measures and SAT scores. The 
inclusion of the interactions between NED scores and the performance measures improved significantly 
the explanatory power of the model, χ2 (2) = 16.473, p < .001.  
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In sum, the results of Study 5B are in line with those of Study 5A. Both studies found the 
propensity to make correspondent inferences to engender miscalibrated performance assessments. 
Participants high in the propensity to make correspondent inferences did not account for the influence of 
job difficulty on candidates’ performance. Even when controlling for intelligence, the NED scale 
substantially improved the ability to predict which participants would ignore the influence of situational 
pressures in their evaluations of job performance. 	
STUDY 6: CORRESPONDENT INFERENCES AND PERSONNEL SELECTION  
In Study 6 we examined in an incentive-compatible context whether the NED predicts personnel 
selections based on attributions of success and failure when both were as much product of the situation as 
the person. We chose to conduct this test using a personnel selection paradigm because the 
implementation of fair and accurate selection procedures can confer competitive considerable financial 
advantages for firms (Schmidt and Hunter 1981; Schmidt et al. 1982). In the study, we incentivized the 
incorporation of situational information in participants’ selection decision, by having them bet a monetary 
bonus on the future performance of their preferred candidate. 
Participants watched a video in which a quizmaster asked a quiz taker challenging trivia questions 
about Supreme Court law. The quiz taker did poorly. Next, participants selected who would perform 
better on an unrelated mythology quiz—the quizmaster or the quiz taker—by placing a real bet on one of 
these two quiz bowl contestants. We expected that propensity to make correspondent inferences would 
predict the extent to which participants neglected the considerable advantages conferred by the situation 
to the quiz master, and (erroneously) bet on her to win. In addition, this study examined whether the 
explanatory power of the NED scale makes a unique contribution above the explanatory power provided 
by measures of personality, intelligence, and cognitive reflection.  
 
Method 
Participants  
Three hundred residents of the United States (154 women; Mage = 35.4 years, SD = 10.8) received 
$4.00 for completing a survey administered through AMT plus the opportunity to place a bet for an 
additional 50¢ bonus. Participants were 83.3% White, 7.7% African American, 5.0 % Asian, 2.7% 
multiracial, 1.0% Native American, and .3% did not indicate their ethnicity.  
Materials and procedure 
Participants completed the 10-item NED, 12 CRT items (same as in Study 2, Sample 2), and the 
BFI (as in Study 2, samples 3 and 4). Both the order of the scales and the order of the items were 
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randomized, with scale items nested within scale. Then they reported their scores on the math and verbal 
sections of the SAT if they had taken the SAT (as in Study 2).  
Afterwards, they watched a video in which two graduate students, Lauren and Erin, engaged in a 
quiz bowl. Participants were told that Lauren, the quizmaster, prepared 10 questions in her preferred 
category (i.e., Landmark United States Supreme Court Cases), and that Erin, the quiz taker, received no 
advance notice of the category. In the video, Erin answered 1 out of 10 questions correctly. Participants 
were then informed that both Lauren and Erin were contestants in a second trivia quiz testing knowledge 
in an unrelated category (i.e., Mythology). Participants saw all ten quiz questions. They bet that either 
Lauren or Erin would answer more questions correctly on the second quiz. If they bet on the higher 
performer, they would receive a 50¢ bonus at the end of the experiment in addition to their compensation. 
(Both Lauren and Erin did actually take the mythology quiz in advance of the study. Erin answered more 
questions correctly.) Finally, participants reported their age, gender, and ethnicity. 
 
Results 
We compared the explanatory power of the NED by estimating its ability to predict the selection 
of a candidate unfairly favored by the situation when also accounting for measures of intelligence (SAT), 
personality (BFI), and cognitive reflection (CRT). Our primary dependent variable was the person upon 
whom each participant chose to bet in the second quiz —the quizmaster whose role conferred an unfair 
advantage in the first quiz or the quiz taker whose role conferred an unfair disadvantage in the first quiz.  
NED scores were computed by averaging across the 10 items (α = .83). We computed a 
composite measure of performance on the 12 CRT questions by assigning a score of 1 to each correct 
answer, a score of 0 to each incorrect answer, and summing all items (α = .76, M = 4.03, SD = 2.70). For 
each of the Big Five personality traits, we computed an overall average score after reverse scoring 
appropriate items (all αs > .81). Since only 172 out of 300 respondents reported their SAT scores, we first 
estimated a logistic regression model on the entire sample to assess the effect of propensity to make 
correspondent inferences, CRT scores, and Big Five personality traits on the likelihood of placing a bet 
that the quizmaster in the first quiz bowl would win the second quiz bowl.  
The first model yielded a positive and significant effect of the NED, β = .277, SE = .122, Wald 
χ2(1) = 5.20, p = .023, exp(β) = 1.32, and a significant and negative effect of CRT scores β = -.119, SE = 
.048, Wald χ2(1) = 6.26, p = .012, exp(β)= .88 on betting the quizmaster to win round 2. Specifically, for 
each unit increase in NED scores, the odds of betting on the quizmaster increased by 32%; the odds 
decreased by 12% for each unit increase in CRT scores. No Big Five personality traits were significant 
predictors, all ps > .123. Table 10 reports the results of this estimation and the comparison of this model 
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with an alternative model not including NED scores. Including NED scores significantly improved the 
predictive ability of the model, χ2(1) = 5.38, p = .02. 
We then estimated a second logistic regression model including SAT math and verbal scores for 
the subsample of participants that reported their SAT scores. It also yielded a positive and significant 
effect of the NED, β = .456, SE = .171, Wald χ2(1) = 7.14, p = .008, exp(β) = 1.58. In this more 
conservative model, each unit increase in NED scores increased the odds of betting on the quizmaster by 
58%. The effect of CRT scores was not significant, β = -.064, SE = .068, Wald χ2(1) = .91, p = .34, 
exp(β)= .94. The effect of one personality variable, agreeableness, was negative and significant, β = -.702, 
SE = .314, Wald χ2(1) = 5.01, p = .03, exp(β)= .495. No other predictors were significant, all ps > .25. 
Table 11 reports the results of this estimation and the comparison of this model with an alternative model 
that does not include NED scores. Again, including NED scores significantly improved the predictive 
ability of the model, χ2(1) = 7.80, p < .001. 
Discussion 
Participants who were more prone to make correspondent inferences were more likely to bet that 
a person unfairly favored by her previous role would perform better than a person unfairly disadvantaged 
by her previous role, when both competed in a task that was equally challenging. The NED added 
significant additional explanatory power beyond measures of intelligence, personality, and cognitive 
reflection in predicting which participants would fail to discount the advantages conferred to the 
quizmaster and the disadvantages conferred to the quiz taker by the roles they previously occupied. 
Indeed, the NED was the only predictor that consistently predicted gambles in the larger and more 
restricted samples. Although the magnitude of the stakes used in this study could be considered small, the 
results of studies using similarly small stakes on AMT are generally consistent with results of studies 
using larger stakes with other populations (Amir et al. 2012).  
 
 
STUDY 7: CORRESPONDENT INFERENCES AND FINANCIAL DECISIONS  
As an additional test of our predictive validity analysis we examined whether NED scores 
influence attributions of credit for investor success and failure, as well as incentive-compatible investment 
decisions based on those attributions. Participants evaluated the performance of two fund managers whose 
fund either decreased in value but outperformed the market, or increased in value but underperformed 
with respect to the market. As in Studies 5A and 5B, information on the situation (i.e., market 
performance) was readily available for participants to adjust their judgments. Nonetheless, we expected 
that propensity to make correspondent inferences would affect the extent to which participants neglected 
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market performance in their evaluations of the fund managers, in their preferences between funds, and in 
a real decision about the fund in which to invest bonus money received in the experiment, which would 
be adjusted by the current performance of the fund.  
 
Method 
Participants  
Two hundreds and one residents of the United States (84 women; Mage = 29.3 years, SD = 9.2) 
received $.75 for completing a survey administered through AMT plus a $1 bonus adjusted based on a 
real investment fund performance (see Appendix 2 for details) as compensation. Participants were 79.6% 
White, 9.5% Asian, 4.5% African American, 3.0% multiracial, .5% Native American, and 2.9% did not 
indicate their ethnicity.  
Materials and procedure 
Participants completed the 10-item NED with items presented in a random order. Afterwards, 
they read information about the performance of two mutual investment funds, one managed by Richard 
and one managed by Lee, in different calendar years. One of the funds decreased in value but 
outperformed the market in 2008, whereas the other fund increased in value but underperformed with 
respect to the market in 2010. For each fund, participants read what the return of the fund had been in 
percentage points, and the amount that would be gained or lost by investing $1000 in that fund for one 
year. In addition, they also read information about the overall market performance (i.e., the return of the 
S&P500 index) in the same year, i.e., an important situational factor affecting the performance of each 
fund. If taking into account situational information, the fund that decreased in value had a superior net 
performance compared to the fund that increased in value. The names of the fund managers were 
counterbalanced (for all values and examples, see Appendix 2). 
After reading the information, participants rated the performance of each of the two fund 
managers on 5-point scales (1 = Not good at all; 5 = Very good). They then made a hypothetical 
investment choice by indicating if they had $1000 to invest and could only choose between the funds run 
by the two fund managers, in which fund they would invest their money on a 5-point scale marked, 
Definitely Richard (1), Probably Richard (2), No preference (3), Probably Lee (4), Definitely Lee (5). 
Finally, participants were told that they would receive a $1 bonus payment to invest in the fund they 
thought superior and that the bonus would be modified by the gains or losses experienced in 2011 by the 
chosen fund. Thus, they would receive the 2011-adjusted bonus at the end of the experiment in addition to 
their initial compensation. Participants were told they were choosing between real funds and that they 
would gain or lose money based on their decision. The fund descriptions are reported in Appendix 2, and 
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were based on the performance of two investment funds that were then used to adjust the value of the 
bonus participants received (i.e., $1.15 or $1.24). The real names of the funds were not included in the 
description, to make sure participants could not search information on the funds performance. Afterwards, 
participants reported their age, gender, and ethnicity. 
 
Results and discussion 
NED scores were computed by averaging across the 10 items (α = .79). A multilevel repeated 
measures analysis was used to estimate the effect of propensity to make correspondent inferences, type of 
investment fund (negative performance but above the market versus positive performance but below the 
market), and their interaction on fund manager evaluations, controlling for the counterbalanced names of 
the fund managers. Since each participant provided evaluations for both managers, to take into account 
the lack of independence between the observations we specified an unstructured variance-covariance 
matrix within the model estimation. We estimated the following model: !"#$!" =  !! +  !!!"#! + !!!"#$! +  !!!"#! ∗ !"#$! + !!!"#$! + !!" 
where Eval refers to the fund manager evaluation rating, index i refers to participants and index j refers to 
the fund evaluated. The dependent variable was thus the evaluative judgment expressed by each 
participant for each of the two funds. The explanatory variables were each participant’s mean-centered 
NED score (NEDi), the type of fund dummy (Fundj: 0 = positive performance but below the market; 1 = 
negative performance but above the market), the interaction between these two variables, and the fund 
manager name set dummy (Namei). Results are based on a total of 402 observations, where each 
observation is the evaluation of a fund manager provided by a participant.   
The results revealed a significant effect of the propensity to make correspondent inferences, β1 = 
.364, SE = .059, t = 6.19, p < .001 and a significant interaction between the propensity to make 
correspondent inferences and the type of fund, β3 = -.488, SE = .101, t = -4.84, p < .001, on evaluations. 
Neither the effect of the type of fund, β2 = .055, SE = .105, t = .52, p = .60, nor the effect of fund manager 
names, β4 = .084, SE = .068, t = 1.24, p = .22, was significant. Table 12 reports the results of this 
estimation and the comparison of this model with an alternative model that includes only the main effects.  
The significant interaction between propensity to make correspondent inferences and type of fund 
was further explored by examining the simple slopes of the type of fund at all levels of propensity to 
make correspondent inferences (Preacher et al. 2006). The results revealed that propensity to make 
correspondent inferences was associated with more favorable evaluations of the manager of the fund that 
increased in value but underperformed with respect to market performance, β = .364, SE = .059, z = 6.19, 
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p < .001, and less favorable evaluations of the manager of the fund that decreased in value but 
outperformed market performance, β = -.124, SE = .061, z = -2.04, p = .04 (see Figure 5). 
We then examined which of the two funds participants preferred using a linear regression model 
with mean-centered NED scores as independent variable and the scale measuring the likelihood of 
choosing between the two funds recoded such that high numbers indicated preference for the fund with a 
positive performance but underperforming with respect to market performance. The effect of propensity 
to make correspondent inferences on choice of this fund was positive and significant, β = .45, SE = .086, t 
= 5.20, p < .001. As was the case for evaluative judgments, participants more prone to make 
correspondent inferences were more likely to prefer the fund that increased in value but underperformed 
with respect to the market than the fund that decreased in value but outperformed the market. 
Finally, we analyzed the effect of the propensity to make correspondent inferences on the 
incentive compatible choice of the fund in which participants decided to invest their dollar obtained as a 
bonus by means of a logistic regression analysis in which the choice between the two funds (0 = negative 
performance but above the market; 1 = positive performance but below the market) was regressed on 
mean-centered NED scores. The results showed that propensity to make correspondent inferences reliably 
distinguished the choice between the two funds, β = .557, SE = .149, Wald χ2(1) = 13.94, p < .001, exp(β) 
= 1.745. Specifically, for each unit increase in NED scores the odds of choosing the fund that increased in 
value but underperformed with respect to the market (i.e., the fund with the inferior net performance) 
would increase by 74.5%. Participants more prone to make correspondent inferences were more likely to 
choose the fund that increased in value but underperformed with respect to the market, in line with the 
results of the previous two analyses. 
Considered together, the results suggest that participants more prone to make correspondent 
inferences were more likely to make dispositional attributions for good and bad absolute performances 
and ignore the comparative value of those performances than participants less prone to make 
correspondent inferences. They were more likely to view a positive gain that was lower than the rise of 
the market favorably, and a loss that was less than the fall of the market unfavorably, despite having the 
information needed to adjust their attributions readily available. The consistency of this pattern across 
performance evaluations, preferences, and incentive-compatible choices made by participants provides 
further evidence of the predictive validity of the NED and of the pervasive effect of correspondent 
inferences not only on judgments, but also on behavior. As in Study 6, we believe that the pattern of 
results observed is not a function of the small magnitude of the stakes used. In general, these findings in 
studies using small stakes on AMT are consistent with the findings of studies using larger stakes with 
other populations (Amir et al. 2012). 
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STUDY 8: DEBIASING CORRESPONDENCE BIAS 
 
In Study 8 we tested a potential debiasing strategy that acts on the mechanism producing 
correspondence bias, the neglect of situational information. People more prone to make correspondent 
inferences do not seem to benefit from the availability of situational information, and may require a 
framing of the information that makes the interplay of situational and individual factors more evident.  To 
this end, we manipulated the accessibility of situational information within the investment decision 
paradigm used in Study 7 to observe whether making situational information easier to process increases 
the extent to which individuals most prone to bias take it into account in their judgments. 
 
Method 
Participants  
Three hundreds and six residents of the United States (111 women; Mage = 33.3 years, SD = 11.6) 
received $.75 for completing a survey administered through AMT. Participants were 78.8% White, 7.5% 
African American, 6.9 % Asian, 4.9% multiracial, .3% Native American, and 1.6% did not indicate their 
ethnicity.  
Materials and procedure 
Participants completed the 10-item NED with items presented in a random order. Afterwards, 
they were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the control condition they read information 
about the performance of the two mutual investment funds described in Study 7, and information about 
the return of the S&P500 index in the same years. In the high accessibility condition, the information on 
the individual performance of the fund and on market performance was aggregated in a table, which also 
contained a figure indicating the net performance of the fund with respect to the market (see Appendix 2). 
After reading the information, participants rated the performance of each of the two fund managers and 
made a hypothetical investment choice between the two funds as in Study 7. The names of the fund 
managers were counterbalanced. Finally, participants reported their age, gender, and ethnicity. 
 
Results and discussion 
NED scores were computed by averaging across the 10 items (α = .79). A multilevel repeated 
measures analysis was used to estimate the effect of propensity to make correspondent inferences, 
accessibility condition, type of investment fund (negative performance but above the market performance 
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versus positive performance but below market performance), and their interactions on fund manager 
evaluations, controlling for the counterbalanced names of the fund managers. Since each participant 
provided evaluations for both managers, to take into account the lack of independence between the 
observations we specified an unstructured variance-covariance matrix within the model estimation. We 
estimated the following model: !"#$!" =  !! +  !!!"#! + !!!""#$%! +  !!!"#$!  + !!!"#! ∗ !""#$%! +  !!!"#! ∗ !"#$! + !!!""#$%! ∗ !"#$! + !!!"#! ∗ !""#$%! ∗ !"#$! + !!!"#$! + !!" 
where Eval refers to the fund manager evaluation rating, index i refers to participants and index j refers to 
the fund evaluated. The dependent variable was thus the evaluative judgment expressed by each 
participant for each of the two funds. The explanatory variables were each participant’s mean-centered 
NED score (NEDi), the accessibility of situational information condition (AccSiti: 0 = controls, 1 = high 
accessibility), the type of fund dummy (Fundj: 0 = positive performance but below the market; 1 = 
negative performance but above the market), the pairwise two-way interactions between these three 
variables, their three-way interaction, and the fund manager name set dummy (Namei). Results are based 
on a total of 612 observations, where each observation is the evaluation of a fund manager provided by a 
participant.   
The results revealed a significant effect of propensity to make correspondent inferences, β1 = 
.478, SE = .081, t = 5.89, p < .001, a significant effect of accessibility of situational information, β2 = -
.324, SE = .102, t = -3.18, p = .002, a significant two-way interaction between propensity to make 
correspondent inferences and accessibility, β4 = -.321, SE = .105, t = -3.06, p = .002, a significant two-
way interaction between propensity to make correspondent inferences and type of fund, β5 = -.841, SE = 
.151, t = -5.56, p < .001, a significant two-way interaction between accessibility and type of fund, β6 = 
.622, SE = .190, t = 3.27, p = .001, and a significant three-way interaction between propensity to make 
correspondent inferences, accessibility, and type of fund, β7 = .559, SE = .195, t = 2.86, p = .005. Neither 
the effect of the type of fund, β3 = -.046, SE = .135, t = -.34, p = .74, nor the effect of fund manager 
names, β8 = .046, SE = .056, t = .83, p = .41, was significant. Table 13 reports the results of this 
estimation and the comparison of this model with alternative models. 
The significant three-way interaction between propensity to make correspondent inferences, 
accessibility of situational information, and type of fund was further explored by examining the simple 
slopes of the type of fund at specific conditional values of the other two predictors (Preacher et al. 2006). 
Specifically, we estimated the effect of the type of fund at different combinations of the accessibility 
(control vs. high) of situational information, and different levels of propensity to make correspondent 
inferences (i.e., one standard deviation below and above the mean NED score). The results revealed that, 
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for participants characterized by low propensity to make correspondent inferences (-1 SD), their 
evaluations of the fund outperforming market performance were significantly higher than their 
evaluations of the fund underperforming with respect to market performance, both when situational 
information was not salient (control condition), β = .790, SE = .207, z = 3.82, p < .001, and when it was 
made salient (high accessibility condition), β = .856, SE = .180, z = 4.80, p < .001. In contrast, for 
participants characterized by high propensity to make correspondent inferences (+1 SD), their evaluations 
of the fund outperforming market performance were significantly lower than their evaluations of the fund 
underperforming with respect to market performance when situational influences were not made salient 
(control condition), β = -.881, SE = .198, z = -4.46, p < .001, but they were not significantly different 
when situational influences were made salient (high accessibility condition), β = .296, SE = .185, z = 1.60, 
p = .11. For these participants, increasing the accessibility of situational information improved the 
evaluations of the fund outperforming market performance, and reduced those of the fund 
underperforming with respect to the market. Figure 6 illustrates the three-way interaction.  
We then examined participants’ hypothetical choice between the two funds using a linear 
regression model with mean-centered NED scores, accessibility condition, and the interaction between 
these two variables as predictors (controlling for the names of the fund managers), and the scale 
measuring the likelihood of choosing between the two funds, recoded such that high numbers indicated 
preference for the fund with a positive performance but underperforming with respect to market 
performance, as dependent variable. This analysis revealed a significant effect of propensity to make 
correspondent inferences, β = .553, SE = .111, t = 4.99, p < .001, a significant effect of accessibility of 
situational information, β = -.477, SE = .140, t = -3.42, p < .001, and a significant two way interaction 
between propensity to make correspondent inferences and accessibility of situational information 
condition, β = -.318, SE = .143, t = -2.22, p = .03. Table 14 reports the results of this estimation and the 
comparison of this model with an alternative model that includes only the main effects.  
To shed light on the nature of the interaction, we examined the effect of accessibility of 
situational information at all levels of propensity to make correspondent inferences using the Johnson-
Neyman method (Spiller et al. 2013). The analysis revealed one Johnson-Neyman point (see Figure 7), 
whereby the effect of accessibility of situational information was negative and significant for participants 
characterized by NED scores higher than 3.73, reducing their preference for the fund characterized by a 
positive return but underperforming with respect to the market. Replicating the pattern of results observed 
for evaluations, participants most prone to make correspondent inferences were the ones most affected by 
the increased accessibility of situational information in (hypothetical) investment decisions requiring 
them to account for market performance. Building on recent evidence showing the persistence of 
correspondence bias even when situational information is readily available (Moore et al. 2010, Swift et al. 
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2013) our results show that individuals less prone to correspondent inference-making are able to make 
more accurate judgments when situational information is provided, but individuals more prone to 
correspondent inference-making are more resistant to the use of situational information unless they are 
nudged toward it. 
 
 
General Discussion 
For half a century, the tendency to make correspondent inferences has been explored empirically 
across different targets, contexts, and dispositions in attributions of attitudes, ability, emotionality, and 
morality. We find that these various forms of correspondent inferences appear to constitute a coherent, 
stable, and unidimensional construct captured by a single factor. It influences consequential judgments 
and decisions faced by people in their professional and personal lives, from attributions of blame and 
guilt, to performance evaluations and personnel selection, to financial investments. The results of the 
eight studies we report provide evidence that there is substantial variation across persons in their 
propensity to make correspondent inferences, but that there are stable individual differences that could be 
targeted by debiasing strategies.  
We developed a measure of propensity to make correspondent inferences—the NED—that 
includes the different dispositional inferences assessed by the canonical four correspondence bias 
paradigms (i.e., attitudes, ability, emotionality, morality; Gawronski 2004). Using a psychometric 
approach, we developed and validated this instrument, and found that the propensity to make 
correspondent inferences is discriminated from intelligence, decision making, cognitive ability and 
cognitive reflection, individual differences in cognitive processing, locus of control, and attributional 
style. In other words, the propensity to make correspondent inferences is not merely one instance of 
generally poor decision making ability or a lack of intelligence. Nor is it a function of individual 
processing style, preference for control, or attributional style. As a latent construct, the propensity to 
make correspondent inferences seems to determine an overconfidence in dispositional attributions that is 
reflected uniformly across a variety of consequential kinds of attributions. 
We did find the propensity to make correspondent inferences to be systematically associated with 
consequential judgments and behaviors that one would predict from an inferential correction model 
(Gilbert 1998). The propensity to make correspondent inferences was associated with the extent to which 
people attributed blame for accidental harm (Study 3). It affected the extent to which people considered a 
defendant to be guilty based on a coerced confession (Study 4). It induced a higher neglect of job 
difficulty when assessing the performance of candidates in a promotion decision (Studies 5A and 5B). It 
Correspondence Bias: Measurement, Consequences, and Correction 39 
increased the odds of betting on a candidate unfairly favored by situational factors in an incentive 
compatible decision (Study 6). Finally, it influenced whether evaluative judgments of and incentive 
compatible choices between fund managers overweighed their absolute performance and neglected their 
performance relative to the market (Study 7). Furthermore, we provide evidence of a potential debiasing 
strategy to reduce the impact of the propensity to make correspondent inferences on judgments by 
increasing the accessibility of situational information with a simple nudge (Study 8). Taken together, 
these results elucidate the nature of the construct, which can be characterized as an overarching bias 
whose strength varies systematically across the general population, which influences patterns of 
correspondent inferences across different types of judgments and decisions. Different from a chronic 
individual difference in personality, the propensity to make correspondent inferences can be mitigated by 
means of appropriate training and situation-specific interventions (see Morewedge et al. 2015, for 
evidence of its susceptibility to debiasing training). 
 The systematic study of individual differences in decision making is in its infancy (Stanovich and 
West 1998, Stanovich 1999). As indicated by several studies (Baron and Ritov 2004, Frederick 2005, Ito 
and Cacioppo 2005, Bruine de Bruin et al. 2007, Scopelliti et al. 2015), such differences appear to be 
prevalent, but their implications have often been overlooked. We believe the identification and 
assessment of individual differences in susceptibility to specific biases is a valuable approach to identify 
the structure and dimensionality of a bias, test its influence in consequential judgments, decisions, and 
behaviors, and to understand whether susceptibility to bias can or cannot be mitigated by means of 
debiasing interventions.  
Structure. Literature on the accuracy of personality judgments5 and other authors (Funder 1987, 
1995, Moore et al. 2010) have criticized classic paradigms used to assess correspondence bias, as most 
provide more vivid, salient, or easy to process information about the behavior of actors than their 
situation. From this view, these paradigms are open to the criticism that correspondence bias is as much a 
bias about what people do with incomplete information (Moore et al. 2010), or information that is not 
representative of what people might reasonable encounter in the world (Funder 1987, 1995). Our results 
are consistent with the idea that the correspondence bias is present even in contexts in which people could 
be accurate. Participants exhibited correspondence bias in Studies 5A, 5B, 7 and 8 (in the control 
condition) even though clear and quantified information about the situational influence on the actors they 
judged was available. Furthermore, our results show that people most prone to make correspondent 
inferences incorporate situational information about actors into their attributions only when that 
information is exogenously made salient and easy to process during judgment. We think these findings 
may help to assuage concerns regarding the accuracy of labeling correspondence bias as a “bias.”  
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Influence. The existence of individual differences in the propensity to make correspondent 
inferences has implications in many contexts and domains where biased attributions of ability or 
intentions have important downstream consequences. For example, personnel evaluation is a ubiquitous 
organizational task based on inferences about ability. Correspondent inferences would result in biased 
ratings of people benefitting from advantageous situations and easy tasks, and in the underestimation of 
the quality of people penalized by disadvantageous or difficult situations. This problem is particularly 
relevant in employee selection, assessment, and consideration for promotion (Swift et al. 2013), as well as 
in school admissions where score and grade inflation are typically not sufficiently accounted for when 
evaluating prospective students (Moore et al. 2010). Biased performance evaluations are not only 
potentially detrimental for organizations that select to hire individuals who perform poorly when hired for 
more challenging tasks than experienced in their previous employment, but they may also contribute to 
the persistence of inequality within organizations, as they may determine an unfair assignment of 
responsibility, rewards, and organizational resources. 
With respect to broader audiences, this tendency is also likely to affect the extent to which 
organizational performance is overattributed to leadership through romanticizing and exaggerating the 
role of leaders within organizations (Meindl et al. 1985, Chen and Meindl 1991). Specifically, it may 
underlie the overestimation of the extent to which CEOs determine the success of companies, a 
phenomenon that affects journalists, shareholders, the general public, and the CEOs themselves. This 
results in the perception of CEOs as celebrities, which in turn leads to overconfidence in their self-
assessments of ability and judgmental accuracy (Hayward et al. 2004). Such over-confidence (at any level 
of organizational responsibility) is detrimental for organizations that might select individuals who will 
perform poorly when hired for more challenging tasks than experienced in their previous employment. 
Similar adverse effects of biased performance evaluations might be observed in investment and 
consumer behavior. The propensity of an investor to make correspondent inferences can lead him or her 
to make suboptimal financial decisions, based on the absolute performance of investment prospects 
without taking into account how the general economic and financial situation may have constrained 
performance. In the domain of consumer behavior, consumers more prone to correspondent inferences 
may be more likely to make dispositional attributions for service failure experiences (Folkes 1984), even 
when the provider is not responsible (e.g., when a snowstorm disrupts product or service delivery), which 
would negatively affect their future purchase intentions (Folkes et al. 1987). Consumers more prone to 
correspondent inferences may also be more likely to interpret celebrity or expert endorsed advertising 
messages as manifestations of the endorser’s dispositions. Hence, they may be more vulnerable to 
persuasion (Cronley et al. 1999, Silvera and Austad 2004).  
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Multiple other domains exist where biased attributions of intention have important consequences. 
Relevant for the reputation of organizations or individuals, an observer’s high propensity to make 
correspondent inferences may result in unduly attributing blame to individuals or organizations that 
caused harm with no intention to do so, or that unintentionally made unethical decisions (Chugh et al. 
2005, Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008). Similarly, these individual differences, while operating 
beyond awareness, may induce both jurors and judges to give wrongful weight and consideration to 
inadmissible evidence in coming to a verdict (Kassin 1997, 2014, Kassin and Sukel 1997, Kassin and 
Wrightsman 1980). In negotiation and conflict resolution, the tendency to attribute the bargaining 
behaviors of a counterpart to her personality or underlying intentions rather than to her situational 
constraints may result in misperceptions and antipathy that escalate conflict and hinder or even prevent 
negotiated agreement (Morris et al. 1999).  
Debiasing. While using the NED to measure the distribution of individual neglect of situational 
information in these relevant domains may be a straightforward first application, our studies suggest the 
NED may be a valuable tool to reduce the influence of correspondence bias in consequential evaluations. 
Consider an organization’s performance evaluation and personnel selection procedures. Simply 
measuring an assessor’s propensity to exhibit correspondence bias during performance evaluations might 
help improve the fairness of the selection procedure by i) providing an estimate of the prevalence of 
biased evaluations; ii) suggesting when situational causes are neglected and need to be made salient; and 
iii) indicating when assessors are biased and need debiasing training.  
Research in judgment and decision making has historically focused on the identification of 
judgmental biases. A relevant new area of advancement has begun to develop and test strategies to 
improve and debias decision making (Milkman et al. 2009, Ratner et al. 2008; Soll et al., 2016). Decision 
making can be improved (Nisbett et al., 1987; Morewedge et al. 2015), but measures of individual 
differences in susceptibility to judgmental biases such as the NED are necessary to quantify the efficacy 
of debiasing. These measures can be used to examine the efficacy and effect size of training interventions, 
for example, whose effects may have been underestimated due to the lack of reliable scales to measure 
stable individual differences in susceptibility to bias (Morewedge et al., 2015).  
Previous research has typically reduced correspondence bias by changing the framing of 
attributions. Frames leading to the adoption of a focus on the situation (e.g., rating the degree to which a 
behavior was due to the situation rather than the actor) have been shown to significantly reduce the 
weight given to dispositional factors (Krull 1993, Krull and Erickson 1995). Rather than by reducing 
correspondent inferences, however, these frames shift their direction so that observers anchor their 
judgments on the situation and insufficiently correct for dispositional influences (Krull 1993). Within the 
same frame, we found that correspondent inference making can itself be reduced with a debiasing strategy 
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that facilitates bias correction—reducing the neglect of situational information by increasing its salience. 
We think this is a strategy that should be easy to adopt when situational information can be made salient.  
 
Conclusion 
The propensity to make correspondent inferences appears to be a coherent, unidimensional, stable 
individual difference. It influences observer inferences regarding the attitudes, abilities, emotionality, and 
morality of actors. Correspondence bias is measurable with a scale that is easy to implement and predicts 
consequential judgments including attributions of blame, juror verdicts, performance evaluations, and 
investment decisions. Research in the last 50 years has done much to elucidate the predictors of 
correspondent inferences and the process by which correspondent inferences influence attributions 
(Gilbert 1998). There is still much to learn about how correspondence bias influences consequential social 
judgments, and predicts more general forms of discounting for contextual influences. We hope the NED 
and our findings elucidate how the influence of correspondence bias in these judgments can be tested and 
quantified. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The scale is named after Edward E. “Ned” Jones, who first found evidence for this tendency and the 
correspondence bias. 
2. AMT workers have been shown to exhibit susceptibility to biases in judgment and decision making 
similar to traditional college samples with respect to common tasks such as the Asian disease problem, 
the conjunction fallacy and outcome bias, to exhibit similar levels of risk aversion, and to exhibit similar 
levels of cooperation in behavioral economics games such as the prisoner’s dilemma (Berinsky et al. 
2012, Horton et al. 2011, Paolacci et al. 2010). 
3. We did not use power analyses in setting our minimum sample sizes because we did not have sufficient 
information to confidently estimate effect sizes. Sample sizes were set as follows: 
• For all studies conducted on AMT, we pre-specified a minimum number of participants:  
a) In Study 1A, since we aimed to obtain a parsimonious instrument with at most 15 items, 
we determined the sample size to N = 150 based on a 10:1 observations to variables ratio 
suitable to conduct a factor analysis (Nunnally 1978). We set the same sample size for 
study 1B. 
b) In Study 2, each sample size was set arbitrarily to a round number equal to 100 (Sample 
2), 120 (Sample 1), 150 (Samples 5, 6, and 7), or 200 (Samples 3 and 4) respondents, 
often reflecting the availability of funds on AMT at the time the study was conducted. 
The same criterion applies to studies in which participants were not randomly assigned to 
conditions, in which sample sizes were set to N = 200 (Studies 5A and 7), or N = 300 
(Study 8). 
c) In studies with clear assignment of participants to conditions, we considered the 
recommendations by Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2013) and set the sample size to 
be greater than 50 per condition, specifically to N = 65 per condition in Study 4, N = 100 
per condition in Study 3, and N = 150 per condition in Study 8. The increases in sample 
sizes reflect the chronological order in which the studies were conducted. 
• For our lab study (Study 5B), we collected as much data as we could in one day worth of 
sessions. 
We did not analyze the data for each study until data collection was completed. No participants were 
excluded from the analyses (except for study 5B where 6 participants who did not report SAT scores 
could not be included in the analyses) and we report all manipulations and measures. Minor 
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discrepancies between the pre-specified number of participants and the final number reported in the paper 
for some of the studies are due to the fact that on AMT a small number of respondents may 
a) submit a completion code shared by another participant – or obtained by completing the 
study from a different AMT account – without having completed the study, resulting in a 
sample size slightly lower than requested (e.g., N = 199 in Sample 3 of Study 2); or 
b) complete the study but fail to submit a completion code within the allotted time slot, 
resulting in a sample size slightly higher than requested (e.g., N = 201 in Study 7, N = 
306 in Study 8).  
4. One participant did not report her level of education. 
5. Three participants did not report their income level. 
6. For a programming error one of the items from the Applying Decision Rules battery and one of the 
items from the Resistance to Framing battery were not administered to participants. 
7. Interestingly, literature on the accuracy of personality judgments also highlights the need for research 
on individual characteristics of the judge as moderators of accuracy in personality judgments (Funder 
1995, 2012). 
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Table 1. NED scale items and corresponding paradigm. 
Item Description Paradigm 
1 
A famous millionaire commissioned a portrait to a local artist for 2 
million dollars. The portrait will be positioned in the hall of a new 
museum that the millionaire has recently funded, to acknowledge his 
contribution. The artist portrays him as a triumphant Roman emperor. 
Based on the information provided, how confident are you that the artist 
admires the millionaire?  
Attitude 
attribution 
2 
Ben and Zach are presenting introductory information to new employees 
at a telemarketing company that calls potential customers with 
information about a home appliance. They flipped a coin to randomly 
pick what topics each would present. Ben talks about sales strategies that 
most often do not work. He recounts stories of being hung up on, insulted 
repeatedly, and led on wild goose chases by people. Zach talks about 
sales strategies that seem to work well. He relates times that he has 
connected with people, built good impressions about the product, and 
arranged large orders with new customers. Based on the available 
information, how confident are you that Zach sells more than Ben?  
Quizmaster 
3 
Mary is working on an essay on the negative aspects of capitalism that 
she was assigned to prepare for her sociology course. The main points she 
plans to include in her essay are: that capitalism is inherently exploitative, 
that it leads to imperialism and oppression, and that it creates wasteful 
practices such as planned obsolescence of products. Based on the 
information provided, how confident are you that Mary's attitude toward 
capitalism is negative?  
Attitude 
attribution 
4 
A struggling freelance writer finally lands her first paid gig. Her 
employer, a political magazine, assigns her to write a piece advocating for 
the election of Senator Smith. Her feature story focuses on these three 
issues: 1) Senator Smith is backing legislation to spur job creation in 
certain sectors; 2) Senator Smith is committed to reducing America’s 
dependence on foreign oil; and 3) Senator Smith is supporting tax cuts for 
small businesses. Based on the information provided, how confident are 
you that the writer supports Senator Smith?  
Attitude 
attribution 
5 
Supermodel Kate Moss has been a celebrity endorser for Rimmel make-
up products for over 10 years. She appeared in more than 20 television 
commercials and in dozens of print advertisements. Based on the 
information provided, how confident are you that she really likes Rimmel 
products? 
Attitude 
attribution 
6 
Wendy found herself crying while watching a sentimental movie, which 
critics raved to be one of the most brilliant, powerful, and emotionally 
stirring films in cinema history. Based on this information, how confident 
are you that Wendy is an emotional person? 
Silent 
interview 
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7 
Deborah had invited Peter to watch her class performance of 
Shakespeare's play A Midsummer Night’s Dream. After the show, 
Deborah and Peter were discussing the plot. During this discussion, 
Deborah had to correct Peter multiple times on important events that 
occurred during the play. Based on the information provided, how 
confident are you that Deborah is more knowledgeable than Peter? 
Quizmaster 
8 
In response to citywide budget cuts a principal is instructed to fire six 
teachers at her school. The principal fires Mary, a young English teacher 
who is extremely popular with the students. Mary is devastated to be 
unemployed and nervous about how she will pay her rent next month. 
Based on the available information, how confident are you that the 
principal is an inconsiderate person? 
Moral 
attribution 
9 
Lily is in the second grade. Her teacher has given all of the second grade 
students an assignment to perform an act of charity and tell the class 
about it. Lily collects $2.50 in change from her family and neighbors, and 
donates it to the Salvation Army. Based on the information provided, how 
confident are you that Lily is a generous child? 
Moral 
attribution 
10 
Paula and Jasmine live in different suburbs of Los Angeles. Paula’s 
suburb collects trash and recycling separately every week, so Paula takes 
the time to separate recyclable paper, plastic, and glass from her trash. 
Jasmine’s suburb does not pick up recycling so she puts all her trash in 
one trash bag. Based on the information provided, how confident are you 
that Paula cares about the environment more than Jasmine?  
 
Moral 
attribution 
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 Table 2. C
orrelations betw
een the 10 selected N
ED
 scale item
s. 
  
 
Item
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
.386** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
.256** 
.350** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
.424** 
.437** 
.438** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
.394** 
.276** 
.267** 
.287** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
.378** 
.375** 
.204** 
.168* 
.157° 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
.211** 
.294** 
.215** 
.167* 
.194* 
.257** 
 
 
 
 
8 
.317** 
.346** 
.365** 
.391** 
.260** 
.373** 
.359** 
 
 
 
9 
.412** 
.414** 
.336** 
.368** 
.235** 
.384** 
.274** 
.321** 
 
 
10 
.372** 
.503** 
.247** 
.353** 
.294** 
.337** 
.326** 
.437** 
.406** 
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Table 3. Item
s and factor loadings from
 exploratory factor analysis in Study 1A
. 
 
Item
 
Factor loading 
1 
.612 
2 
.677 
3 
.515 
4 
.604 
5 
.452 
6 
.518 
7 
.437 
8 
.607 
9 
.619 
10 
.655 
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Table 4. C
om
pletely standardized param
eters from
 confirm
atory factor analysis in Study 1B
. 
 
Item
 
Param
eter 
1 
.567 
2 
.585 
3 
.539 
4 
.645 
5 
.513 
6 
.474 
7 
.376 
8 
.390 
9 
.645 
10 
.448 
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Table 5.  Scale reliabilities and correlations w
ith the N
ED
 scale in Study 2. 
 Construct 
α 
N
 
r 
 Intelligence 
 
 
 
SA
T
M
ath  
-- 
412 
-.13* 
SA
T
V
erbal  
-- 
412 
-.12* 
D
ecision M
aking C
om
petence 
 
 
 
R
esistance to fram
ing 
.46 
121 
.10 
R
ecognizing social  norm
s 
.73, .85 
121 
-.01 
U
nder/overconfidence 
.86 
121 
.05 
A
pplying decision rules 
.61 
121 
-.21* 
C
onsistency  in risk perception 
.73 
121 
-.19* 
R
esistance to sunk costs 
.53 
121 
-.21* 
C
ognitive Reflection Test - Perform
ance 
 
 
 
12 item
s 
.77 
101 
-.31** 
3 ‘original’ item
s 
.76 
101 
-.24* 
9 new
 item
s 
.62 
101 
-.30** 
C
ognitive Reflection Test – Reliance on Intuition 
 
 
 
12 item
s 
.57 
101 
.23* 
3 ‘original’ item
s 
.69 
101 
.22* 
9 new
 item
s 
.20 
101 
.18° 
Big Five Personality Traits 
 
 
 
N
euroticism
 
.88 
399 
-.08 
Extraversion 
.88 
399 
.11* 
O
penness 
.82 
399 
-.06 
A
greeableness 
.83 
399 
.19** 
C
onscientiousness 
 
98 
.04 
 
.86 
399 
.08 
N
eed for C
ognition 
.91 
199 
-.21** 
D
esirability of C
ontrol 
.83 
199 
.12° 
N
eed for Precision 
.87 
199 
-.07 
N
eed to Evaluate 
.87 
199 
.01 
Locus of C
ontrol 
.77 
151 
.02 
C
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Attributional Style 
 
 
 
Internality 
.68 
150 
.22** 
Stability 
.55 
150 
-.05 
G
lobality 
.68 
150 
.04 
N
eed for C
ognitive C
losure 
.86 
152 
.19* 
 
 
 
 
N
ote: ** p < .01; * p < .05; º p < .10 
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Table 6. R
egression results and m
odel com
parison for Study 3. 
  
 
 
M
ain Effect M
odel 
Full M
odel 
V
ariable 
B
a 
SE
 
t 
p 
B
a 
SE
 
t 
p 
Intercept 
2.214 
.103 
21.56 
<.001 
2.214 
.103 
21.56 
<.001 
N
ED
b 
.186 
.030 
6.27 
<.001 
.265 
.033 
8.02 
<.001 
Type of Scenario
 
1.568 
.032 
49.00 
<.001 
1.568 
.032 
49.15 
<.001 
Set 
.171 
.064 
2.67 
.008 
.171 
.064 
2.67 
.008 
N
ED
b * Type of Scenario
 
 
 
 
 
-.159 
.030 
-5.39 
<.001 
 
 
Variance com
ponents 
 
E
stim
ate 
SE
 
W
ald z 
p 
E
stim
ate 
SE
 
W
ald z 
p 
Intercept 
.153 
.020 
7.48 
<.001 
.154 
.020 
7.50 
<.001 
R
esidual 
1.229 
.027 
47.96 
<.001 
1.221 
.025 
47.96 
<.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2 Log-Likelihood 
14889.709 
14860.730 
df 
6 
7 
A
IC
 
14901.709 
14874.730 
B
IC
 
14940.567 
14920.065 
Likelihood R
atio Test  
 
28.979 (1), p < .001 
a U
nstandardized coefficients 
b M
ean-centered 
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Table 7. R
egression results and m
odel com
parison for Study 4. 
  
 
 
M
ain Effect M
odel 
Full M
odel 
V
ariable 
B
a 
SE
 
t 
p 
B
a 
SE
 
t 
p 
Intercept 
5.23 
.276 
18.94 
<.001 
5.265 
.271 
19.46 
<.001 
N
ED
b 
.354 
.182 
1.94 
.054 
-.039 
.234 
-.17 
.868 
C
onfession
 
.059 
.391 
.150 
.881 
.071 
.383 
.19 
.852 
N
ED
b * C
onfession
 
 
  
  
  
.937 
.361 
2.59 
.011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
2 
.029 
.078 
A
djusted R
2 
.014 
.056 
F C
hange (1,126) 
 
6.73 
Sig F C
hange 
 
p =
 .011 
a U
nstandardized coefficients 
b M
ean-centered 
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Table 8. R
egression results and m
odel com
parison for Study 5A
. 
   
 
 
M
ain Effect M
odel 
Full M
odel 
V
ariable 
B
a 
SE
 
t 
p 
B
a 
SE
 
t 
p 
Intercept 
-.875 
.223 
-3.93 
<.001 
-.875 
.218 
-4.02 
<.001 
N
ED
b 
.108 
.044 
2.45 
.015 
-1.650 
.226 
-7.31 
<.001 
Individual Perform
ance
 
.068 
.003 
23.91 
<.001 
.068 
.003 
24.43 
<.001 
A
djusted Perform
ance 
.149 
.006 
25.10 
<.001 
.149 
.006 
25.65 
<.001 
N
ED
b * Individual Perform
ance 
 
 
 
 
.023 
.003 
7.94 
<.001 
N
ED
b * A
djusted Perform
ance
 
 
 
 
 
-.054 
.006 
-9.14 
<.001 
 
 
Variance C
om
ponents 
 
E
stim
ate 
SE
 
W
ald z 
p 
E
stim
ate 
SE
 
W
ald z 
p 
Intercept 
.273 
.036 
7.49 
<.001 
.277 
.036 
7.60 
<.001 
R
esidual 
1.141 
.034 
33.58 
<.001 
1.09 
.033 
33.58 
<.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2 Log-Likelihood 
7582.688 
7484.438 
df 
6 
8 
A
IC
 
7594.688 
7500.438 
B
IC
 
7629.536 
7546.902 
Likelihood R
atio Test  
 
98.25 (2), p < .001 
a U
nstandardized coefficients 
b M
ean-centered 
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 Table 9. R
egression results and m
odel com
parison for Study 5B
. 
   
 
 
M
ain Effect M
odel 
Tw
o-W
ay Interactions w
ith SA
T 
Full M
odel 
V
ariable 
B
a 
SE
 
t 
p 
B
a 
SE
 
t 
p 
B
a 
SE
 
t 
p 
Intercept 
4.429 
.725 
6.11 
<.001 
5.730 
4.441 
1.29 
.197 
5.222 
4.477 
1.17 
.244 
N
ED
b 
.176 
.061 
2.89 
.005 
.177 
.061 
2.91 
.004 
.514 
.462 
1.11 
.266 
SA
T
M
ath 
.001 
.001 
1.72 
.088 
.010 
.006 
1.74 
.083 
.011 
.006 
1.85 
.065 
SA
T
V
erbal 
-.001 
.001 
-1.72 
.088 
-.011 
.006 
-2.03 
.043 
-.011 
.006 
-2.06 
.040 
Individual Perform
ance
 
-.0003 
.005 
-.057 
.954 
-.017 
.057 
-.30 
.765 
-.010 
.057 
-.18 
.86 
A
djusted Perform
ance 
.013 
.011 
1.11 
.268 
-.408 
.119 
-3.42 
.001 
-.355 
.120 
-2.95 
.003 
N
ED
b * Individual Perform
ance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.004 
.006 
-.74 
.461 
N
ED
b * A
djusted Perform
ance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.034 
.012 
-2.71 
.007 
SA
T
M
ath * Individual Perform
ance 
 
 
 
 
-.0001 
.00007 
-1.52 
.130 
-.0001 
.00008 
-1.64 
.102 
SA
T
M
ath  * A
djusted Perform
ance 
 
 
 
 
.0004 
.0002 
2.42 
.016 
.0003 
.0002 
1.72 
.087 
SA
T
V
erbal  * Individual Perform
ance 
 
 
 
 
.0001 
.00007 
1.82 
.070 
.0001 
.00007 
1.84 
.066 
SA
T
V
erbal  * A
djusted Perform
ance
 
 
 
 
 
.0003 
.0002 
1.72 
.087 
.0003 
.0002 
1.85 
.064 
 
 
Variance C
om
ponents 
 
E
stim
ate 
SE
 
W
ald z 
p 
E
stim
ate 
SE
 
W
ald z 
p 
E
stim
ate 
SE
 
W
ald 
z 
p 
Intercept 
.137 
.044 
3.08 
.002 
.141 
.045 
3.17 
.002 
.143 
.044 
3.207 
.001 
R
esidual 
2.105 
.089 
23.70 
<.001 
2.06 
.087 
23.70 
<.001 
2.041 
.086 
23.70 
<.001 
 
-2 Log-Likelihood 
4454.272 
4432.463 
4419.804 
df 
8 
12 
14 
A
IC
 
4470.272 
4456.463 
4447.804 
B
IC
 
4511.171 
4517.811 
4519.376 
Likelihood R
atio Test  
 
21.809 (4), p < .001 
12.659 (2), p = .0017 
a U
nstandardized coefficients 
b M
ean-centered 
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Table 10. R
egression results and m
odel com
parison for Study 6, full sam
ple, no SA
T.   
  
 
Logistic Regression M
odel 
 
 
 
M
odel w
ithout N
ED
 
M
odel w
ith N
ED
 
V
ariable 
B
a 
SE
 
W
ald 
p 
exp(B
) 
B
a 
SE
 
W
ald 
p 
exp(B
) 
Intercept 
2.689 
1.388 
3.757 
.053 
14.723 
1.418 
1.501 
.893 
.345 
4.129 
N
ED
 
 
 
 
 
 
.277 
.122 
5.200 
.023 
1.320 
C
R
T-12
 
-.148 
.046 
10.574 
.001 
.862 
-.119 
.048 
6.255 
.012 
.888 
Extraversion 
-.128 
.133 
.923 
.337 
.880 
-.125 
.135 
.853 
.356 
.883 
A
greeableness 
-.213 
.219 
.946 
.331 
.808 
-.272 
.223 
1.483 
.223 
.762 
C
onscientiousness 
-.179 
.213 
.708 
.400 
.836 
-.163 
.216 
.568 
.451 
.850 
N
euroticism
 
-.267 
.164 
2.670 
.102 
.765 
-.256 
.166 
2.378 
.123 
.774 
O
penness 
.097 
.169 
.328 
.567 
1.102 
.127 
.172 
.547 
.459 
1.136 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2 Log-Likelihood 
399.994 
394.616 
df 
6 
7 
N
agelkerke R
2 
.064 
.087 
Likelihood R
atio Test  
 
5.378(1), p = .020 
a U
nstandardized coefficients 
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Table 11. R
egression results and m
odel com
parison for Study 6, subsam
ple (N
 = 172) including SA
T.   
  
 
Logistic Regression M
odel 
 
 
 
M
odel w
ithout N
ED
 
M
odel w
ith N
ED
 
V
ariable 
B
a 
SE
 
W
ald 
p 
exp(B
) 
B
a 
SE
 
W
ald 
p 
exp(B
) 
Intercept 
2.736 
2.250 
1.479 
.224 
15.424 
.081 
2.522 
.001 
.974 
1.084 
N
ED
 
 
 
 
 
 
.456 
.171 
7.141 
.008 
1.578 
C
R
T-12
 
-.115 
.063 
3.316 
.069 
.891 
-.064 
.068 
.910 
.340 
.938 
Extraversion 
-.103 
.193 
.284 
.594 
.902 
-.155 
.199 
.609 
.435 
.856 
A
greeableness 
-.594 
.303 
3.856 
.050 
.552 
-.702 
.314 
5.012 
.025 
.495 
C
onscientiousness 
.002 
.310 
.000 
.995 
1.002 
.111 
.323 
.118 
.731 
1.117 
N
euroticism
 
-.222 
.232 
.920 
.338 
.801 
-.203 
.240 
.716 
.397 
.816 
O
penness 
.118 
.246 
.233 
.630 
1.126 
.138 
.251 
.300 
.584 
1.148 
SA
T
M
ath  
-.001 
.002 
.167 
.683 
.999 
-.001 
.002 
.440 
.507 
.999 
SA
T
V
erbal  
.001 
.002 
.356 
.551 
1.001 
.003 
.002 
1.349 
.245 
1.003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2 Log-Likelihood 
227.861 
220.060 
df 
8 
9 
N
agelkerke R
2 
.079 
.135 
Likelihood R
atio Test  
 
7.801(1), p < .001 
a U
nstandardized coefficients 
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Table 12. R
egression results and m
odel com
parison for Study 7. 
  
 
M
ixed M
odel 
 
 
 
M
ain Effect M
odel 
Full M
odel 
V
ariable 
B
a 
SE
 
t 
p 
B
a 
SE
 
t 
p 
Intercept 
2.900 
.120 
24.20 
<.001 
2.900 
.120 
24.46 
<.001 
N
ED
b 
.126 
.032 
3.90 
<.001 
.364 
.059 
6.19 
<.001 
Type of Fund
 
.055 
.111 
.49 
.623 
.055 
.105 
.52 
.604 
M
anager N
am
e 
.084 
.068 
1.24 
.217 
.084 
.068 
1.24 
.217 
N
ED
b * Type of Fund 
 
 
 
 
-.488 
.101 
-4.84 
<.001 
 
 
C
ovariance Param
eters 
 
E
stim
ate 
SE
 
W
ald z 
p 
E
stim
ate 
SE
 
W
ald z 
p 
V
ariance (Fund
i =0) 
.820 
.083 
9.79 
<.001 
.758 
.076 
10.02 
<.001 
V
ariance (Fund
i =1) 
.886 
.090 
9.80 
<.001 
.817 
.082 
10.02 
<.001 
C
ovariance 
-.392 
.066 
-5.93 
<.001 
-.327 
.060 
-5.44 
<.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2 Log-Likelihood 
1028.582 
1006.389	
df 
7 
8 
A
IC
 
1042.582 
1022.389 
B
IC
 
1070.557 
1054.361 
Likelihood R
atio Test  
 
22.193(1), p < .001 
a U
nstandardized coefficients 
b M
ean-centered 
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Table 13. R
egression results and m
odel com
parison for Study 8. 
    M
ixed M
odel 
 
 
 
 
M
ain Effect M
odel 
Tw
o-W
ay Interactions M
odel 
Full M
odel 
V
ariable 
B
a 
SE
 
t 
p 
B
a 
SE
 
t 
p 
B
a 
SE
 
t 
p 
Intercept 
2.881 
.067 
42.84 
<.001 
3.023 
.079 
38.49 
<.001 
3.017 
.078 
38.71 
<.001 
N
ED
b 
.057 
.028 
2.01 
.045 
.327 
.062 
5.26 
<.001 
.478 
.081 
5.89 
<.001 
Type of Fund
 
.258 
.102 
2.53 
.012 
-.059 
.137 
-.43 
.666 
-.046 
.135 
-.34 
.735 
A
ccessibility 
-.043 
.056 
-.77 
.44 
-.326 
.103 
-3.17 
.002 
-.324 
.102 
-3.18 
.002 
M
anager N
am
e 
.046 
.056 
.83 
.41 
.046 
.056 
.83 
.410 
.046 
.056 
.83 
.410 
N
ED
b * Type of Fund  
 
 
 
 
-.506 
.097 
-5.22 
<.001 
-.841 
.151 
-5.56 
<.001 
N
ED
b * A
ccessibility 
 
 
 
 
-.070 
.057 
-1.21 
.226 
-.321 
.105 
-3.06 
.002 
Type of Fund * A
ccessibility 
 
 
 
 
.627 
.193 
3.25 
.001 
.622 
.190 
3.27 
.001 
N
ED
b * Type of Fund * 
A
ccessibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.559 
.195 
2.86 
.005 
 
 
C
ovariance Param
eters 
 
E
stim
ate 
SE
 
W
ald z 
p 
E
stim
ate 
SE
 
W
ald z 
p 
E
stim
ate 
SE
 
W
ald z 
p 
V
ariance (Fund
i =0) 
.895 
.074 
12.07 
<.001 
.812 
.066 
12.29 
<.001 
.797 
.064 
12.37 
<.001 
V
ariance (Fund
i =1) 
1.196 
.099 
12.12 
<.001 
1.097 
.089 
12.31 
<.001 
1.075 
.087 
12.37 
<.001 
C
ovariance 
-.553 
.067 
-8.24 
<.001 
-.463 
.060 
-7.71 
<.001 
-.445 
.059 
-7.58 
<.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2 Log-Likelihood 
1655.248 
1616.936 
1608.858 
df 
8 
11 
12 
A
IC
 
1671.248 
1638.936 
1632.858 
B
IC
 
1706.581 
1687.520 
1685.858 
Likelihood R
atio Test  
 
38.312(3), p < .001 
11.96(1), p = .005 
a U
nstandardized coefficients 
b M
ean-centered 
 
 
 
 
Correspondence Bias: Measurement, Consequences, and Correction 69 
Table 14. Regression results and model comparison for Study 8. 
 
 
  
 
Main Effect Model Full Model 
Variable Ba SE t p Ba SE t p 
Intercept 3.184 .122 26.04 <.001 3.178 .122 26.15 <.001 
NEDb .363 .071 5.14 <.001 .553 .111 4.99 <.001 
Accessibility -.479 .140 -3.42 .001 -.477 .140 -3.42 <.001 
Manager Name -.040 .140 -.29 .776 -.043 .139 -.31 .758 
NEDb * Accessibility     -.318 .143 -2.22 .027 
         
R2 .116 .130 
Adjusted R2 .107 .118 
F Change (1, 301)  4.914 
Sig F Change  p = .027 
a Unstandardized coefficients 
b Mean-centered  
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Figure 1. Scree-plot from the exploratory factor analysis, with observed and parallel random eigenvalues 
in Study 1A. 
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Figure 2. Histogram of NED scores in Study 1B. High scores indicate greater propensity to make 
correspondent inferences; range is 1 to 7; median is 4.20. 
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Figure 3. Relationship between propensity to make correspondent inferences and blame attributed for 
intentional and accidental harms in Study 3. 
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Figure 4. Regression lines with Johnson-Neyman points identifying the regions of significance of the 
effect of coerced confession in Study 4.   
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Figure 5. Relationship between propensity to make correspondent inferences and investment evaluations 
in Study 7. 
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Figure 6. Influence of investm
ent funds and accessibility of m
arket perform
ance on investm
ent evaluations for participants w
ith low
 vs. high 
propensity to m
ake correspondent inferences in Study 8. 
 
	
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 
C
ontrol 
H
igh A
ccessibility 
Fund Manager Evaluation 
L
ow
 N
E
D
 (M
ean - 1SD
) 
Positive Perform
ance, B
elow
 M
arket 
N
egative Perform
ance, A
bove M
arket 
1 2 3 4 5 
C
ontrol 
H
igh A
ccessibility 
Fund Manager Evaluation 
H
igh N
E
D
 (M
ean - 1SD
) 
Positive Perform
ance, B
elow
 M
arket 
N
egative Perform
ance, A
bove M
arket 
Correspondence Bias: Measurement, Consequences, and Correction 76 
Figure 7. Regression lines with Johnson-Neyman point identifying the region of significance of the effect 
of the debiasing treatment on preference for the fund with positive, below market performance in Study 8. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Summaries of criminal trials used in Study 4 (underlined section was not included in the control 
condition). 
 
  
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
November 9-12, 1981 
   
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS Plaintiff      vs.    SAMUEL ADAMS, Defendant 
  
CHARGE: Aggravated Assault 
 
 
 
The Prosecution   
 
The Defendant, Mr. Samuel Adams, was charged with the crime of aggravated assault for the stabbing of 
Michael Zemp. Zemp owed Adams money, so he set up a time and place to meet and talk about the debt. 
The two men sat at a corner table in the back of the Jackson tavern. During what became a heated 
discussion, Zemp accidentally pushed the table into Adams, who fell to the floor. At that point, a fight 
broke out. The State believes that Adams then stabbed Zemp in the stomach with a piece of broken glass, 
with intent to injure, and should be found guilty. Michael Zemp testified. Zemp explained that he and 
Adams met by pre-arrangement at the Jackson Tavern. Zemp said that, at one point, he accidentally 
pushed the table forward with his knees, knocking it into Adams and forcing him to the ground. Adams 
was furious and screamed as he fell. A fight then broke out, others joined in, and there was a great deal of 
confusion. Before he knew it, Zemp was knocked to the ground, bleeding, with a sharp pain in his 
stomach. All he could remember from then on was waking up in a hospital bed. Officer Thompson put 
Adams under arrest, read him his rights, and took him to the police station for questioning.  
  
After several hours of interrogation, Adams finally confessed. He said he was drinking, Zemp had 
provoked him, and everything was very confusing. Seeing broken glass on the floor, and being "pissed 
off" about the situation, Adams admitted that he stabbed Zemp. 
  
The State Closed its case by arguing that the evidence compelled the conclusion that Adams brutally 
stabbed Zemp in the heat of an argument because he was angry. 
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The Defense 
 
 The defense argued that Adams was not guilty. Zemp had pushed him to the ground, he said, and 
threatened to beat him, but he did not stab the man. The Defendant testified that he went to the bar 
because Zemp owed him money. The defendant said Zemp got angry and refused to repay the loan. 
According to Adams, Zemp shoved the table at him, knocked him to the ground, and challenged him to a 
fight. Adams said that he was scared because Zemp is bigger than he is and was in a state of rage. Before 
he knew it, others jumped in to break up the scuffle, but it got worse. According to Adams, someone in 
the crowd -- not him -- stabbed Zemp. "I would never do such a thing," he said. "I've never even been 
arrested before."  
  
When asked about his confession, Adams explained that he was interrogated at a time when he was upset 
and vulnerable, he felt trapped and thought that the best solution was to confess in spite of his innocence. 
The next morning, he withdrew the confession and claimed his innocence. 
  
The defense then cross-examined Officer Thompson. Thompson reported that the Defendant did not resist 
arrest or try to escape. He also described Adams as "shaking" and "disoriented." 
  
The defense concluded that the State had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and that the 
jury should submit a verdict of not guilty. 
  
  
Correspondence Bias: Measurement, Consequences, and Correction 79 
APPENDIX 2 
 
Investment fund description used in Study 7 and 8 (control condition). Managers’ names were 
counterbalanced. 
 
Fund that decreased in value but outperformed the market 
 
Richard's fund decreased in value by 20.5% in 2008. In other words, if you invested $1000 in Richard's 
fund on January 1st, 2008, it would be worth $795 on December 31st, 2008.  
 
Please note that the S&P500 index of US stocks decreased by 37.5% in the year 2008. That means that 
stocks on average decreased by 37.5% in value.   
 
Fund that increased in value but underperformed with respect the market 
 
Lee's fund increased in value by 8% in 2010. In other words, if you invested $1000 in Lee's fund on 
January 1st, 2010, it would be worth $1080 on December 31st, 2010.  
 
Please note that the S&P500 index of US stocks increased by 15.06% in the year 2010. That means that 
stocks on average increased by 15.06% in value.   
 
 
Funds used as anchors: 
 
Richard’s fund is Vanguard Explorer  
2008 performance is -20.5%  
2009 performance is +9.2% 
2010 performance is +12.3%  
2011 performance is +24.0% 
 
Lee’s fund is Vanguard Growth Equity 
2008 performance is -25.0% 
2009 performance is +8.0% 
2010 performance is +8% 
2011 performance is +15% 
 
Market 
2008 performance is -37.0% 
2009 performance is +26.46% 
2010 performance is +15.06% 
2011 performance is +2.05% 
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Investment fund descriptions used in Study 8 (high accessibility condition). Managers’ names were 
counterbalanced. 
 
 
Fund that decreased in value but outperformed the market 
 
Richard's fund decreased in value by 20.5% in 2008. In other words, if you invested $1000 in Richard's 
fund on January 1st, 2008, it would be worth $795 on December 31st, 2008.  
 
Please note that the S&P500 index of US stocks decreased by 37.5% in the year 2008. That means that 
stocks on average decreased by 37.5% in value.   
 
 
 
 
Fund that increased in value but underperformed with respect the market 
 
Lee's fund increased in value by 8% in 2010. In other words, if you invested $1000 in Lee's fund on 
January 1st, 2010, it would be worth $1080 on December 31st, 2010.  
 
Please note that the S&P500 index of US stocks increased by 15.06% in the year 2010. That means that 
stocks on average increased by 15.06% in value.   
 
 
